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GOVERNMENT SECRETS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
AND PLATFORMS FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Adam M. Samaha
American law has yet to reach a satisfying conclusion about public access to
information on government operations. But recent events are prompting
reconsideration of the status quo. As our current system is reassessed, three
shortfalls in past debates should be overcome. The first involves ignorance of
foreign systems. Other democracies grapple with information access problems,
and their recent experiments are illuminating. Indeed they expose two additional
domestic weaknesses. One is a line we have drawn within constitutional law.
Courts and commentators tend to treat constitutional issues of public access
separately from those of executive discretion to withhold information, but these
matters should be seen as parts of an integrated system. When they are, it is
difficult to constitutionalize one without the other. The final deficiency concerns
the boundary between constitutional and ordinary law. In a very practical
sense, constitutional law and judicial intervention in this field should turn on the
character of nonconstitutional law-whether nonjudicial actors have built an
adequate "platform" for judicial action. That connection is not obvious but a
defensible access system is impossible without confronting it. This Article aims
to remedy these three mistakes, and it presents a method for evaluatingjudicial
platforms in the information access context and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION

American law has yet to reach a satisfying conclusion about public
access to information on government operations. But recent events are
prompting reconsideration of the status quo. Clandestine executive efforts to
combat terrorism have dramatized tensions between secrecy and accountability.' At the same time, reporters persist in cultivating confidential
sources-and vice versa. For example, the informal network of White House
officials and mass media journalists was the vehicle for exposing Valerie
Plame as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative in 2003. In 2004,
another informal network delivered information to the New York Times
regarding a post-9/11 wiretapping project conducted by the National Security
Agency, which the newspaper held back until late 2005. The wiretapping
story and the Plame affair raised serious concerns about the tradition of
extralegal discretion to disclose information, as well as the judgment of
journalists who enter confidential source relationships.' Meanwhile, the
1.
See infra Part I.A.
2.
See, e.g., David Johnston, Inquiry Into Wiretapping Article Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006,
at A24; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
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formal law of information access is also under stress. With critics worried that
existing law is too weak or too strong or both, Congress occasionally
entertains serious reform proposals. Some of these proposals aim to protect
government-held information;3 others would codify a journalist-source
privilege or bolster statutory rights to disclosure.4
What should public access norms look like? Through which institutions should they operate? The United States is not the only country facing
these questions. Every government is confronted with them. Every society,
moreover, develops a system for disseminating information about government
operations. No functioning state can withhold all such information. But
no government of any significant size can be perfectly "transparent," either.
The live choices are about the system's details-including the mixture of
formal law and informal relationships, the circumstances for public access
and official secrecy, and the opportunities for executive discretion and
judicial intervention.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many aspiring democracies
have responded with constitutional law and judicial review.' Whatever
informal access mechanisms exist in those countries, they are supplemented
with fundamental law enforced by courts. In apparent contrast, U.S. courts
have sometimes indicated that public access is a matter for executive and
legislative discretion.' "The Constitution itself," in Justice Stewart's words,
7
"is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act." The
D.C. Circuit delivered a similar message when it ratified a refusal to disclose
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Richard B. Schmitt, JournalistJailedfor Not Revealing Source to Court,L.A. TIMES,
July 7, 2005, at Al (describing Judith Miller's decision to disobey a court order that she testify
before a grand jury investigating the leak); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith
Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005).
See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, H.R. 6, 109th Cong. § 661(0 (2005) (seeking to
3.
ensure that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may issue rules to protect classified information
regarding a risk-assessment study); Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act of 2005, H.R. 173,
109th Cong. § 233 (2005) (proposing to protect port information, including some now public,
that might increase vulnerability).
See, e.g., Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S.340, 109th Cong. §§ 4, 7(1) (2005)
4.
(proposing to grant certain information gatherers a privilege against revealing their sources in
federal proceedings); Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National (OPEN) Government
Act of 2005, S.394, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (proposing to enhance time limits on agency
responses); Faster Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), S.589, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to
establish a Commission on Freedom of Information Act Processing Delays).
See infra Part I.B.
5.
See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion); id.
6.
at 16 & n.* (Stewart, J., concurring) (recognizing accommodation rights for the press yet noting
that "[florces and factors other than the Constitution must determine what government-held data
are to be made available to the public").
631, 636 (1975).
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
7.
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information about post-9/11 detainees,' and several prominent scholars
have essentially agreed.9 Indeed, there are powerful objections to the
judiciary designing a system of access and secrecy for the rest of government. 10 True, federal courts might be usefully detached from the desires
of incumbent officials and the schemes of their opponents. But judicial
expertise is limited. An acceptable system must reconcile competing interests and wrestle with the reality that information often is obtained through
informal channels. So perhaps U.S. courts do, and should, bow out."
Our story is not so simple, however. Consider information about
the executive branch of the federal government. We now have a
statutory, administrative, and judicial system to evaluate public access
8. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("[D]isclosure of government information generally is left to the 'political forces' that govern a
democratic republic."), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
9.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80-81, 86-87 (1975) (relying
on politics and leaks to the press); RONALD DWORKIN, A MAT-ER OF PRINCIPLE 76 (1985); Ronald
Dworkin, Is the Press Losing the First Amendment?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 4, 1980, at 49, 51-52
(leaving open situations in which an agency arbitrarily denies all information about its
operations); see also LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 146 (1991) (warning against

"the massiveness of the enterprise of developing a general newsgathering right"); DAVID M. O'BRIEN,

THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 40, 166-67

(1981); Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional
Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 514 (1980) (arguing that the Constitution offers no principled
basis for adjudicating access claims); cf. Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy:
Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to
Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 731 (1984) (demanding "reasonable
grounds ... to believe that the President or executive officials are using secrecy to cover up
violations of federal law").
10.
By "system" I mean a set of components that should be seen as interrelated. Cf.
SUNNY Y. AUYANG, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPLEX-SYSTEM THEORIES IN ECONOMICS,
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, AND STATISTICAL PHYSICS 151, 154-55 (1998) (distinguishing
systems from collective analysis). I concentrate on the system of public access to information
about the federal executive branch.
11.
Important alternative perspectives include Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 602-11 [hereinafter Blasi, The Checking
Value]; Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundationsof the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14; and
Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1986). See also MARK
G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 246-55 (1983); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 489-95 (1985); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press
Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992) (supporting special access privileges
for the press); Steven Helle, The News-Gathering/PublicationDichotomy and Government Expression,
1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 52-59 (arguing for a robust constitutional duty of government to disclose
information); Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to
Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95 (2004) (advocating access in the
deportation context); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004)
(arguing for information gathering rights, but limited to certain categories of gatherers).
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demands-including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 2 the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA),'3 the Government in the Sunshine Act,'4
the Presidential Records Act," the Federal Records Act, 6 and the Executive
Order on classified information. 7 Federal courts regularly use such material
to adjudicate access disputes.
Moreover, U.S. courts do not treat the existing access system as a Constitution-free zone. They have restricted nonconstitutional access claims
that threaten executive functions by pointing to implications of constitutional structure. If such restraints on access claims are justifiable (and they
are), then what about modifications of other kinds? Might constitutional
inferences support enhanced public access to government information, even
if the Constitution is best read to require no access claims in the first place?
This question points to a broader issue: whether there are situations in which
courts may draw on constitutional norms only after some other institution
creates a platform for their intervention. My answer is a cautious yes.
Sometimes courts should neither design nor prompt a new system, yet they
should be free to elaborate on a system initiated by others. Information access
systems are one example. This Article offers a way to think about others.
The analysis proceeds in three parts and makes three principal contributions. Part I offers reasons for incorporating information access norms
into law, including supreme constitutional law. Democratic governance is
premised on some measure of public access to information about government operations. Laws aimed at regulating information access help achieve
an acceptable measure of exposure, without jeopardizing executive efficacy
or unduly relying on officials' personal preferences. Indeed, these norms are
good candidates for constitutionalization and even judicial enforcement.
Although largely overlooked in this country, many recently drafted national
constitutions make a commitment to public access and state secrecy. In
addition, some foreign constitutional courts demand disclosure even without
an explicit public access provision. These forays into the access field have
been episodic and measured; they show a judicial preference for sharing
responsibility with other institutions that is pragmatic and suggestive; and
their lessons have not been assessed in the law literature.

12.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).

13.

Id. app. §§ 1-16.

14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. § 552b.
44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2000).
Id. §§ 3101-3107.
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003).
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Part II turns to our own constitutional order. Few courts have
endorsed a general constitutional norm of access to government information.
Instead, the U.S. Constitution has been read to imply official discretion to withhold certain information. The most obvious example is the
doctrine of executive privilege, but less recognized instances occur in FOIA
and FACA cases. Not all court-generated constitutional law inhibits public
access, however. Openness in many judicial proceedings is guaranteed, and
private parties are fairly free to disseminate information that happens to
escape from government sources. Scholars have identified each of these
constitutional positions, but their coexistence is underexplored-and
problematic. 1" The defense for one piece sometimes clashes with the
justification for another. And there is a persuasive structural argument,
grounded in democratic premises and skepticism about official motives, which
would add public access to the list of constitutional norms.
Why has this order lasted? The given reasons are basically pragmatic.
Concerns about institutional competence have become stock arguments
against constitutionalizing public access. First, it has been asserted that the
judiciary lacks easily ascertainable standards for specifying the content of
any access guarantee. Second, alternative methods are available to mediate
access disputes, such as statutory claims and cultivation of sources by a
competitive news media. Public access, therefore, might be a constitutional
value that is rightly underenforced by the judiciary. 9
Even these reasons are difficult to accept on second thought. Heavy
reliance on informal access networks is now quite controversial and always
came with a price. However essential these networks are for revealing deep

18.

For exceptional efforts to analyze more than one component of this scheme, see Lillian

R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 311, 314-15, 339 (1982) (identifying difficulties in reconciling court access guarantees
with prior access cases); Blasi, The Checking Value, supra note 11, at 602-11 (supporting a
reporter's privilege along with information access rights); and Sunstein, supra note 11, at 905-09
(critiquing the combination of modest speech rights for public employees with minimal public
access rights and constraints on government control of truthful information, such as weapons
technology). See also Cheh, supra note 9, at 709-12 (arguing for enhanced government employee
speech rights but limited judicial review of administrative systems to ensure secrecy). Emerson,
supra note 11, deserves credit for helping us see the interests in gathering, disseminating, and
receiving information as an integrated system of constitutional significance.
19.

See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 6 (2004) ("There is and should be a gap between the Constitution
itself and the judicially enforced Constitution."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 106-07 (1993) (suggesting that access to government information is a
judicially underenforced First Amendment norm, and FOIA is a reasonable response); David A. Strauss,
Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 358-59 (1991) (similar).
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secrets, they are only one part of a healthy access system." But the problem
for the status quo is more serious than popular skepticism about today's
journalists and their official patrons. Rather than point in the same direction, arguments about nonjudicial alternatives can collide with the presumption of judicial incompetence. Part III explores this idea. Congress
and the executive have constructed a system for analyzing a large number of
access claims, and this system enlists the judiciary. Perhaps no court could
have designed that access system, nor ordered anyone else to do so. But
once an access system is up and running, judicial improvisation becomes
practically easier. In other words, the United States already has a platform
for judicial intervention into access disputes. The issue is whether the judicial role should be restricted to implementation of the system as given, within
the confines of ordinary statutory work, or whether courts are empowered to
modify it further. Like relevant foreign access law, this question also has had
no serious treatment in the law literature."
We ought to hesitate at this opportunity for court action, for reasons
examined below. Under certain circumstances, however, the judiciary should
elaborate constitutional law from constitutionally optional platforms. Such
action requires (1) a legitimate constitutional mission, (2) a practical obstacle
to independent judicial intervention, (3) an existing system that helps solve
the problem, and (4) assessment of resulting risks.22 Forerunners do exist, but
the platforms model is admittedly unorthodox. It demands an unconventionally
soft boundary between ordinary and constitutional law, which is a notion that
contemporary scholars are only beginning to mine.23 In any event, the
possibilities are attractive. We might achieve a democracy-promoting role for
20.
See infra Part L.A and text accompanying notes 168-180.
21.
In a paragraph of his influential piece, Emerson noted that information access statutes
provide "a good start" in defining the scope of a defensible constitutional right. Emerson, supra
note 11, at 17; cf. THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 138-39
(1992) (drawing on in camera proceedings in FOIA litigation to support judicial intervention in
foreign affairs cases). Outside the access field, Lawrence Sager recently has pressed the notion
that "[clonstitutional judges are part of a contemporary partnership with popular governmental
actors which promises more complete constitutional justice than could be realized by the courts
alone." SAGER, supra note 19, at 7. Sager goes on to contend that sometimes courts should
enforce minimum welfare rights "once other institutions of government have acted and created
contexts in which the issue of right surfaces largely unencumbered by other questions." Id. at 95;
cf. Michael C. Doff, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 935-37
(2003) (explaining experimentalist courts and "big" cases involving complexity as opposed
to "hard" cases involving fundamental disagreement). It is this kind of collaboration that I
will explore, but I distinguish welfare rights below. See infra text accompanying notes 295-296.
22.
See infra Part III.C.3.
23.
See infra text accompanying notes 243-246 (comparing and contrasting platforms with
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn's "super-statutes" and Gerhard Casper's "framework legislation").
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the courts that is legitimate, desirable, and feasible-a role that is within
the domain of constitutional value and that does not rely on unrealistic
hopes for action by other institutions, but that ameliorates serious difficulties
associated with unassisted structural reform and unbridled policymaking. 4

I.

SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY

The individual provisions of the U.S. Constitution say little about
government secrecy or public access." If constitutional law reaches either
one, it is due to reasoning of a different kind. The arguments are structural
and institutional, involving the proper relationship between citizen and
government and a reliable system for resolving tension between openness
and efficacy. Thus it helps to begin with general thinking on secrecy
and democracy.
A.

Access Assumptions

Like other forms of government, modem democracies seek legitimacy-a
social condition in which the government's power is thought to be justified
and worthy of respect.26 But they do so in a particular way. Democracies
promise responsiveness and accountability to popular will, rather than claim
obedience by divine right or by the threat of overwhelming force. 7 Citizens
will appreciably influence the direction of government, and they will have
an opportunity to assess progress and assign blame.2" This influence is

24.
Contrast the assertive model for judicial action in Owen M. Fiss, Forward:The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12, 17, 27-28, 33-34, 43-46, 57-58 (1979) (recognizing difficulties in
court-orchestrated structural reform but defending it in light of the alternatives and the asserted
expertise of courts in giving meaning to constitutional values), and Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 (1984).
25.
See infra Part ll.B.
26.
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Proceduraljustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME
& JUST. 283, 308 (2003); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1795-96 (2005); cf. David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1861 (2005) ("[Iun constitutional debates, an assertion of legitimacy
is generally used, and should only be used, to make a certain kind of moral claim: that a
government action is not entitled to a full measure of obedience.").
27.
On the evolution of democracy at the national level, see, for example, ROBERT A. DAHL,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989). For a compatible argument that majoritarian political
accountability should be seen as just one mechanism for protecting liberty, see Rebecca L. Brown,
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998).
28.
See, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison) ("If we advert to
the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over
the Government, and not in the Government over the people."); cf. James Wilson, Pennsylvania
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plainly limited, however. Some popular demands might be declared out of
bounds without the government losing its fundamentally democratic
character; 29 actual, individual consent to government authority is not the
strategy or even a coherent prospect; 0 and existing democracies do not
permit people to "govern themselves" in a strong sense. They retain
perceptible lines between government and the governed, with the former
sometimes coercing the latter. These governments garner legitimacy by
maintaining an adequate connection between public and private forces-not
by their fusion.
There are many ways to accomplish this connection. Familiar models
include representative, deliberative, participatory, and direct democracy.
Each has a different aspiration for the form and intensity of private
involvement in governance. Some theories view democracy as a method of
accurately exposing and registering the preferences of often uninterested
voters; others want democratic institutions to function as forums for the
articulation and alteration of private interests, toward the formation of
public-regarding individuals. Important features are common to all of the
models, however. Consider, for example, the widespread adoption of voting
rights with broad-based adult suffrage, plus serious limits on government
authority to punish
a person's beliefs, communication, or association on
32
politics.
of
matters
Such core elements in a genuine program of popular accountability
need a system for disclosing information about government. 3 Without
Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787) ("[Tlhe sovereignty resides in the people."), in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 265 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
29.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from abridging "the freedom
of speech"); id. amend. XV, § 1 (guaranteeing citizens' right to vote against denial on account of
race). But cf. id. art. V (authorizing "Amendments to this Constitution").
30.

See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 30-31 (2004); Paul

Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 226 (1980).
31.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE, at xiv-xv, 117 (1984); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE

POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 154 (2003); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY:
WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 6-7, 239-43 (2001).

32.

See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalizationof Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 575,

579-80; Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 95, 97-98 (2003) (discussing Council of Europe members).
See FRANCIS E. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY 4-5,
33.
39-40 (1961) (asserting government's interest in influencing opinion formation and posing
government secrecy as a threat to public observation and control); Emerson, supra note 11, at 14;
see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982); GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 31, at 95-101 (discussing the publicity principle, traceable in some form
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meaningful information on government plans, performance, and officers,
the ability to vote, speak, and organize around political causes becomes
rather empty. One will have a difficult time assessing the incumbent
administration in the absence of information concerning revenue, spending, and the progress of government initiatives. Only the most modest
understanding of the citizen's role in politics-retrospective voting on passive
experience-might do without such information access. This understanding could itself foreclose the government's democratic legitimacy.
But does a system of public access need any specialized law to succeed?
To what extent does democracy require a formal system for access to information, with rules speaking directly to the matter and legal institutions
reserved for effectuating those rules? Should we instead rely on an informal
system arising from incentives and interests that are unhitched to any
access law per se? There is good reason to think that some formal law is
helpful, although the conclusion is not a quick one.
Take the executive branch. It is headed by an elected president and
populated by tax-paid employees. They can be seen as agents of the public
charged with acting for the public's benefit. 4 Many might take that role
seriously as a matter of personal honor or ethics. Without effective monitoring,
however, some of these officials will be work-shy, careless, corrupt, or otherwise
willing to abuse the power afforded by their positions.35 Indeed, if they want
to retain power and are givenunrestrained discretion to manage information
access, we might expect them to disclose information that makes the administration look public spirited, effective, and efficient, but withhold information

to both Bentham and Kant, as a presumption to promote democratic accountability); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) ("Just so far as,
at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good."); Letter from James Madison to
W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910) (lauding a public education program and stating that "[a] popular Government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or,
perhaps both").
34.
See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court,94 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1980).
35.
See, e.g., 2 MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, in ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956, 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968) (1922) ("This
superiority of the professional insider every bureaucracy seeks further to increase through the
means of keeping secret its knowledge and intentions."); cf. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (London, Hunt & Clarke, 1827) (discussing trials and asserting that
"[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient"); LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases.").
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to the contrary. This story accords with well-known examples of executive
efforts to conduct questionable business behind closed doors-such as
President Johnson's spin on military progress in Vietnam, the Nixon
Administration's Watergate scandal, the Reagan Administration's IranContra affair, and the healthcare and energy policy task forces during the
Clinton and the second Bush Administrations. Part or all of these efforts
subsequently became public, of course, but that is cold comfort. If the desire
to mislead via control over information access persists, is there good reason to
believe that the desire will be thwarted swiftly and systematically rather
than slowly and episodically? 7
Surely there can be impediments to excessive secrecy without any
access law. Some government operations are so visible that the public need
not rely on official representations, at least to judge outcomes. Federal
income tax paid by an individual is one instance. Second, some high-ranking
officials will not pursue a single-minded agenda of political entrenchment.
Some will act on what they perceive to be the dictates of conscience or the
public good, which include the revelation of bad news.
More important, the United States has an active though informal system of information access that makes unauthorized disclosure possible and
even routine." Whistleblowing and leaking produced vivid mass media exposure of detention practices at the Abu Ghraib prison and on Guantanamo
Bay.39 In addition, the possibility of leaks should dampen enthusiasm ex ante
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of
36.
Transparency in Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999, at
115 (Matthew J. Gibney ed., 2003); Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the
Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2004).
Other examples of executive secrecy include internal assessments about the need for
37.
Japanese internment, and the government's radiation experiments on unconsenting Americans--stories
that came out long after the fact. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417-19
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting a writ of coram nobis); Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu
in Support of Petitioners at 17-20, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343);
Nestor M. Davidson, Note, ConstitutionalMass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the Human Radiation
Experiments, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (1996); see also Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein,
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261, 263-64 (2002) (relating the FBI's good fortune in learning about Nazi saboteurs who had
entered the country during World War II).
See, e.g., Lawrence K. Grossman, Reflections on Leaks in the United States: The Media
38.
Perspectives, in FREE SPEECH AND NATIONAL SECURITY 78, 79 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1991).
39.
See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU
GHRAIB, at xv-xvi, 22, 34-35, 44 (2004); ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE: A
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SOLDIER'S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTANAMO (2005).
Law has, however, plainly contributed to recent reporting. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Justice
Department Opens Inquiry Into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A20
(drawing on anonymous sources and documents obtained by the ACLU under FOIA); see also Eric
Lichtblau, F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al, A20.
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for secrecy among high-ranking officials. Public perceptions of a cover up
can result in severe political consequences, and government officials surely
value the first opportunity to frame the significance of a revelation. Even
the most crassly self-regarding executive official might then consider not
only the benefit of secrecy, but also the risk of unauthorized disclosure, the
costs of minimizing it, and the upside of preemptive disclosure.
Finally, competitive politics might promote openness. When aspiring
officeholders face off in elections, they could compete away their authority
to withhold information. This prospect has been seriously doubted, however.' While voters have reason to fear shirking and cheating, they might
lack a reliable mechanism for detecting breaches of access promises, 41 one
candidate will have difficulty making a credible promise of better behavior
than another, and future electoral defeat is "a fairly blunt instrument" for
enforcing access guarantees. 42 Alternatively, government officials might
promise to relinquish secrecy for a slightly different reason: to extend or to
retain the scope of government power.43 "Transparency" could boost voter
support for state action. But similar doubts are in order here, too. Detection of secrecy and blunt penalties are still problems. We also must assume
that public officials prefer greater (or at least stagnant) job responsibilities,
when they might instead prefer less tuff to police' and so never offer openness in the first place.

40.
See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political
Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131, 132-33, 137-38
(Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
41.
Transparency in the violation of transparency norms is a problem whether the system
includes access law or not. Political scientists and sociologists have pointed to this difficulty by
distinguishing "deep" from "shallow" secrets. Sometimes information outsiders are aware that
information is being withheld from them (making the secrecy shallow); other times they are not
(making the secrecy deep). See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 31, at 121; KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 21 (1988);
Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SC. Q. 181 (1999); infra text accompanying
note 179 (discussing the importance of leaks); cf. Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of
Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. REV. 337, 370 (1997) (recognizing the distinction but disagreeing, from
a Kantian perspective, with Scheppele's Rawlsian conclusions). In any event, deep secrecy is
probably a more severe problem with respect to executive than to legislative action. Legislatures usually
affect the world through formal legislation, which is presumably public before it becomes
enforceable (excepting, for example, the intelligence budget).
42.
Ferejohn, supra note 40, at 137.
43.
See id. at 133-34, 136-40; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 414-15 (2004) (elaborating on the political
competition theme as applied to Congress).
44.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915 (2005) (challenging assumptions that government tends unjustifiably to expand in a
systematic way).
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Political pressure has certainly instigated disclosure in the past. A
recent example might be the 9/11 Commission's investigation," which was
initially opposed by a president whose party enjoyed (narrow) majorities in
Congress. 6 But these results are the product of conditions, not givens. They
might not be satisfied in a particular democracy at a particular time.
Concerns for adequate access are more serious regarding executive action
that is difficult for individuals to detect on their own; when social, professional, and legal penalties for unauthorized disclosure make it less likely; and
where political opposition is weak and public skepticism is minimal.
Equally problematic is a failure to provide any standard for judging whether
public access is appropriate. Even if an official is willing to disclose information whenever it serves the public interest, it is a mistake to grant unre7
strained individual authority to make that judgment. Some officials will
be far too cautious; others will offer too much disclosure for the public's
own good. It makes sense, then, to add law to the system of access. Law
can be consciously designed to account for these circumstances.
Indeed, the argument for access regulation may be stronger for the
public sector than for corporate management. The average shareholder can
more easily sever her connection to secretive corporate managers than can the
4
average voter exit a disturbingly clandestine government. " Our national
government is closer to an inescapable monopoly than a voluntarily chosen
stock investment. Again, there are elections for both corporate and political
office. But mechanisms of control over government officials by voters are
9
likely less forceful than those used to discipline corporate management.
With respect to the U.S. presidency, matters are not helped by repeated final50
period problems that accompany a two-term limit.
Finally, promoting access to information about government might represent an agreement to disagree about behavioral norms. Prodisclosure policies
can implement a compromise: exposing conduct for evaluation by principals
45.

See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION

REPORT (2004).
See Scot J. Paltrow, Full Disclosure: White House Hurdles Delay 9/11 Commission
46.
Investigation, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2003, at Al; Bush Opposes 9/11 Query 6Panel, CBS NEWS,
May 23, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/15/attackmain50909 .shtml.
For further analysis of leaking as an informal option, see infra text accompanying notes 168-180.
47.
See Stiglitz, supra note 36, at 127-28. A few liberals might have moved to Canada
48.
after the 2004 elections, but probably not many. Cf. Rick Lyman, Some Bush Foes Vote Yet Again,
With Their Feet: Canada or Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at A16 ("Firm numbers on potential
6migras are elusive.").

49.

See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of

ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355-56 (2000).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
50.
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instead of specifying good or bad conduct in law ex ante. A democratic society
might facilitate citizens' ability to judge their government on individually
chosen normative principles. We might not be willing or able to agree on
statutory language intended to cap private influence on lawmakers, for
example, and yet find adequate support for rules that mandate the disclosure
of contacts between lobbyists and legislators. The for-profit private sector
seems different. There is perhaps a narrower band of rational grounds for judging corporate behavior and objectives (for example, maximizing investor
wealth) such that the costs associated with broad access rights become less
tolerable." We might reasonably conclude that a few measures of financial
health are sufficient in the corporate context, without ordinarily requiring by
law disclosures that detail outsider influence on managerial decisions. In any
event, access-promoting law seems at least as desirable in the context of
government operations.
None of this dictates "government transparency." That might be a
fine slogan, but it does not suggest a realistic platform.52 Unfettered access
to government information will cripple the state's public-regarding efforts as
much as anything else. Openness exposes not just waste, fraud, and abuse,
but also battle plans, law enforcement sources, confidential and otherwise
candid advice, intimately private information, and trade secrets. In addition,
social welfare might be enhanced if the government sometimes withholds
its enforcement policies from the public, like the algorithm for selecting
income tax returns for audits or the patterns of police patrols.53 Restricted
information flow can therefore enhance government efficacy and prevent
commercial or personal injury to private parties. A rule of full disclosure
might also prompt officials to sanitize the public record as it is created. Nor
will information fuel only public-welfare-enhancing interests. Access can
facilitate rent-seeking at the expense of the common good, or translate
destructive populist rages into formal law.54
51.

Cf. Levinson, supra note 49, at 355 ("Unlike investors in private firms, then, the

principals of governments do not share a singular interest in maximizing firm value.").

52.
See Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 583
(1986) ("[Slociety is distinctly ambivalent about the benefits of increased knowledge."); Mark
Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 8,
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=686998).
53.
See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
54.
See generally Vermeule, supra note 43, at 412-13; Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The
Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1962) (adding that openness
may deter public officials from constructive confessions of ignorance). On the tension between the
need for public-regarding reasons and open deliberation in democracy, see Simone Chambers, Behind
Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation,12 J. POL. PHIL. 389 (2004).
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Thankfully, radical public access seems to have occurred only under
defunct regimes and perhaps in extremely small communities where the
line between public and private disappears. Every other living democracy
must make choices about what to reveal and what to conceal, understanding
that disclosure might threaten vital objectives while secrecy might threaten
government legitimacy. They aim for government "translucency" more
than "transparency."
B.

Comparative Constitutional Law

Assuming that access law is desirable, what form should it take? How
should it manage the contest among values of openness, injury prevention,
and efficacy? One option is to use constitutional law and judicial review.
If access law is denominated fundamental and supreme, we might (not
must) be more confident that it will withstand attack from political elites,
bureaucrats, and destructive partisan desires. If an independent judiciary
is involved, we might (not must) gain advantage from the judgment of an
5
institution somewhat insulated from ordinary politics." These propositions
go beyond public access claims. They also can support executive secrecy.
56
Several other democracies seem to accept these propositions. Even
ignoring "right to receive information" provisions, which might not reach
unwilling government sources, at least two-dozen foreign constitutions now
explicitly command some degree of public access to government-held information or records. 7 These provisions are not merely hortatory; there is a
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
55.
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88, 102-03,112 (1980); SAGER, supra note 19, at 74.
See Mark Tushnet, The Possibili&es of CparativeConsitutionalLaw, 108 YALE LJ. 1225, 1228
56.
(1999) (suggesting the possible value of cautiously analyzed foreign experience).
Freedominfo.org puts the number of access provisions at more than forty, see DAVID
57.
BANISAR, THE FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND ACCESS
TO GOVERNMENT RECORD LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 4 (2004), http://www.freedominfo.org/
survey.htm, but that number seems to include provisions that do not speak to executive access or that
more vaguely declare a right to receive information, e.g., SATVERSME [Constitution] art. 100 (Lat.).
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
S. EXEC. Doc. E. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10, opened for signature
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); HERDIS THORGEIRSDOTIR,
JOURNALISM WORTHY OF THE NAME: FREEDOM WITHIN THE PRESS AND THE AFFIRMATIVE SIDE OF

ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111-17 (2005).
Unless otherwise noted, citations are to English translations of constitutions collected by
the Venice Commission. See 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE: TEXTS COLLECTED BY THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE VENICE COMMISSION, at vii (2004) (noting forty-six constitutions in the
collection). Cases and English-language summaries thereof are also available at the Commission's
website (http://codices.coe.int). Other sources were used to extend the scope of case law reviewed.
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significant body of case law in the field. And while these sources cannot be
restated as a uniform constitutional law of access, they do share a provocative point: It is appropriate to constitutionalize a measure of public access
to government information, and even a measure of secrecy. Moreover,
enforcement of access guarantees is a multi-institutional effort. When foreign
courts intervene, they tend to rely on the work of other political actors,
sometimes explicitly leaving room for judicial retreat. Foreign experience
therefore suggests that constitutional access norms are feasible and useful if
their aspirations are limited.
1.

Textual Provisions

Written access guarantees vary in strength. A weak type is simply
legislation prompting, ordering the legislature to enter the field without
providing an independently enforceable public access right. Access
clauses in the constitutions of Estonia, Greece, and the Netherlands likely
fall into this category.58
Most access clauses are more ambitious, however. For example, a second
type constitutionalizes a baseline of public access. Although the location of
the baseline may differ and legislative exemptions may be authorized, these
provisions are self-executing. The constitution of the Czech Republic
seems to fit this model. Its text obligates government to disclose certain
information, apparently without waiting for legislation: "Organs of the
State and of local self-government shall provide in an appropriate manner
information on their activity."59 But this provision leaves room for subsequent legislative judgment: "The conditions and the form of implementation of this duty shall be set by law."'
58.
See EEST1 VABARIIGI [Constitution] § 44, para. 2 (Est.) (stating that authorities must provide
certain information about their work but "pursuant to procedure provided by law"); 1975 SYNTAGMA
[Constitution] art. 10.3 (Greece) ("A request for information shall oblige the competent authority to
reply, provided the law thus stipulates."); GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN
[Constitution] art. 110 (Neth.) ("In the exercise of their duties government bodies shall observe the
right of public access to information in accordance with rules to be prescribed by Act of Parliament.").
59.

LISTINA ZAKLADNfCH PRAV A SVOBOD [Charter of Fundamental Rights and

Freedoms] art. 17.5 (Czech Rep.).
60.
Id.; accord KUSHTETUTA E REPUBLIKES SE SHQIPERISE [Constitution] art. 23.1-.2
(Alb.) (declaring that "[tihe right to information is guaranteed" but also stating that "[elveryone
has the right, in compliance with law, to get information about the activity of state organs, as well as
of persons who exercise state functions") (emphasis added); DE BELGISCHE GRONDWET
[Constitution] art. 32 (BeIg.); CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA art. 74

(declaring that every person has a right to access public documents "except in cases established by
law"), reprinted in 4 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1, 8 (Gisbert H. Flanz

ed., 2005); KONSTITUSYON [Constitution] art. Ill, § 7 (Phil.), reprinted in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF
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Finally, many access clauses impose explicit restraints on legislative
discretion. They may dictate a degree of secrecy, a degree of openness, or
both. Take Romania. Its access provision begins with a qualified declaration
of openness-"A person's right of access to any information of public interest
cannot be restricted'6-while another clause makes clear that this right
"shall not be prejudicial to the protection of the young or to national
security. '62 In Austria, administrative officials "shall impart information
about matters pertaining to their sphere of competence," but only "insofar as
3
this does not conflict with a legal obligation to maintain secrecy." Another
provision adverts to secrecy obligations. These officials
save as otherwise provided by law, [are] pledged to secrecy about all
facts of which they have obtained knowledge exclusively from their
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at

163, 170 (1986);

CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK

REPUBLIC art. 25.5; USTAVA REPUBLIKE STOVENIJE [Constitution] art. 39, para. 2 (Slovn.); see
also Legaspi v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 150 S.C.R.A. 530, 534-35, 541-42 (1987) (en banc) (Phil.)
(declaring that its constitutional provision is self-executing, and ordering disclosure of information
to check civil service eligibility of city health department employees).
Other wrinkles are possible. South Africa's 1996 Constitution straddles the line between
legislation-prompting and access baselines. It provides that everyone has a right of access to
information held by the state, see S. AFR. CONST. 1996, sched. 6, § 32(1)(a), and that "[niational
legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right," id. sched. 6, § 32(2). A transitional provision
indicated that, in the absence of such legislation, access rights are limited to
"information... required for the exercise or protection of any of their rights." Id. sched. 6,
§ 23(2)(a)(1). And a third clause seems to deprive the legislature of authority to enact access
legislation if it delays for three years. See id. sched. 6, § 23(3). South Africa thus encouraged
legislation without requiring it, with inaction resulting in a modest but self-executing access
provision. See generally Jonathan Klaaren, Access to Information and National Security in South Africa,
in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 189 (2003)
(critiquing implementation of this guarantee with regard to national security information).
CONSTITUTIA ROMANIEI art. 31.1 (emphasis added); see also KONSTITUTSIIA
61.
[Constitution] art. 41.2 (BuIg.) (referring to "information ... on any matter of legitimate interest"
to the requesting citizen); cf. USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE [Constitution] art. 38, para. I (Croat.)
("Journalists shall have the right to freedom of information.").
CONSTITUTIA ROMANIEI art. 31.3; see also KONSTITUTSIIA [Constitution] art. 41.1
62.
(Bulg.) (granting a general right to obtain information but declaring that it shall not be exercised
to the detriment of the rights of others, "national security, public order, [or] public health and
morality"); id. art. 41.2 (granting rights to obtain information "which is not a state or official
secret and does not affect the rights of others"); USTAV REPUBLIKE HRVATSKE [CONSTITUTION]
art. 37 paras. 1-2 (Croat.) ("Everyone shall be guaranteed the safety and secrecy of personal
data.... Protection of data and supervision of the work of information systems in the State shall
be regulated by law."); CONSTITUTIA REPULICII MOLDOVA art. 34.3 ("The right of access to
information may not prejudice either the measures taken to protect the citizens or the national
security."); THAIL. CONST. § 58 (1997) ("A person shall have the right to get access to public
information in possession of a State agency, State enterprise or local government organization, unless
the disclosure of such information shall affect the security of the State, public safety or interests of
other persons which shall be protected as provided by law."), reprintedin 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 60, at 1, 13 (1998).
BUNDS-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] art. 20(4) (Austria).
63.
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official activity and whose concealment is enjoined on them [1] in
the interest of the maintenance of public peace, order and security,
[2] of universal national defense, of external relations, [3] in the
interest of a public law corporate body, [4] for the preparation of a
61
ruling or [51 in the preponderant interest of the parties involved ....

Other constitutions enhance public access by restricting legislative discretion. Finland's constitution states that documents and recordings possessed by government authorities are public "unless their publication has for
compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act., 65 A legislative
exemption from public access must therefore satisfy a clear statement rule
and be supported by a persuasive justification. Alternatively, some constitutions speak directly to the standards for access. In Poland, the list
of acceptable justifications for secrecy is extensive and perhaps flexible, but
closed. Limitations on rights to obtain information "may be imposed by
statute solely to protect freedoms and rights of other persons and economic
subjects, public order, security or important economic interests of the State."66
Sweden's Freedom of the Press Act has the oldest heritage, the most
detail, and arguably the strongest restraints on legislative discretion.67 It
combines elements from each of the constitutions just discussed. Exemptions
from access require a clear legislative statement, necessity, and accordance
with one of seven categories. 68 The first of several detailed articles thus
declares that "[e]very Swedish citizen shall be entitled to have free access to
official documents, in order to encourage the free exchange of opinion and
64.

Id. art. 20(3).

CONSTITUTION OF FINLAND § 12, para. 2, reprinted in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 60, at 1, 3 (2000); cf. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG

65.

ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 61, §§ 1, 3 (Hung.) ("[Elveryone has the right.., to access and
distribute information of public interest.... A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members
of Parliament present is required to pass the law on the public access to information of public
interest...."); CONSTITUTION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 2(5) ("Information involving intimate
personal matters and that is expressly excluded by law or for reasons of national security is [not

subject to disclosure]."), reprinted in 14

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,

supra note 60, at 2 (2005).
66.
KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution] art. 61.3 (Pol.) (emphasis
added); cf. CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 105(b) (Spain) (requiring the law to regulate citizen access
to administrative records and files "except as they may concern the security and defence of the
State, the investigation of crimes and the privacy of individuals"); CONSTITUIQAO DA
REPOBLICA PORTUEGUESA art. 268.2 (Port.) (similar).
67.
For another old, but narrower, provision, see LA DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
ET DU CITOYEN [The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen] art. 14 (Fr.) (adopted Aug.
20, 1789) ("All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their representatives, as to
the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to what uses it is put.").
68.
See TRYCKFRIHETSFRORDNINGEN [Constitution] ch. 2, arts. 1-2 (Swed.). Sweden passed a
freedom of the press law in 1766, adopted the Freedom of the Press Act in 1949, and amended it in 1976.
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69
the availability of comprehensive information." Article 2 then explains
that this access right "may be restricted only if restriction is necessary having
7
regard to" seven categories of possible exemptions. " Those categories include
national security and international relations, crime control, privacy, and even
"the preservation of animal or plant species."'" As for the clear-statement
rule, Article 2 adds that "[any restriction of the right of access to official
documents shall be scrupulously specified in a provision of a special act of law,
7
Although
or... in another act of law to which the special act refers."
Sweden does not have a tradition of robust judicial review, its access provision
is nevertheless meaningful.73

2.

Judicial Intervention

Like the character of access provisions, judicial intervention into the
access field differs across countries. If there is one theme in the foreign
decisions, it is that courts are reluctant to dictate access norms independently and conclusively. They tend to proceed cautiously whether or not
constitutional text speaks to the issue. Bulgaria presents a rather extreme
illustration of judicial retreat. Its access provision looks self-executing:
"Citizens shall be entitled to obtain information from state bodies and
agencies on any matter of legitimate interest to them which is not a state or
74
official secret and does not affect the rights of others." Yet that country's
constitutional court was unwilling to move without more specific legislative
authorization, holding that "[tihe concrete contents" of the obligation to
provide information "cannot be determined in any other manner but
through legislation."" Not every court is so shy, however. Indeed, foreign
Id.ch. 2, art. 1.
69.
See id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
70.
See id.
71.
See id. (emphasis added).
72.
See Bernard Michael Ortwein I, The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction, 13 IND.
73.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405,408 n.1 7, 414-15 (2003).
KONSTITUSIA art. 41.2 (Bulg).
74.
ALEXSANDER KASHAMOV, ACCESS TO INFORMATION LITIGATION IN BULGARIA 11 n.8
75.
(2002), available at http://www.aip-bg.org/pdf/court-eng.pdf (quoting the Constitutional Court of
Bulgaria, Case No. 7/96, Ruling No. 7 of 4.VI.1996 (Dec. 6, 1996)); see also Constitutional Court
of Bulgaria, Case No. 11/2002, Decision No. 3 (Sept. 25, 2002) (as summarized in
http://www.constcourt.bg/constcourt/ks-engframe.htm) (dividing and therefore upholding the repeal of
legislation providing access to defunct secret police files); K,-roly BArd, Judicial Independence in the
Accession Countriesof Centraland Eastern Europe and the Baltics, in JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 265, 284 (Andris
Saj6 ed., 2004) (suggesting a lack of public confidence in Bulgaria's judicial system); Alexander
Kashumov, National Security and the Right to Infonnation in Bulgaria,in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN
GOVERNMENT: STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE, supranote 60, at 121, 124-25,134.
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judiciaries have employed several techniques to invigorate public access
norms without assuming sole or even primary responsibility for the system.
a.

Nondelegation and Clarification

Some foreign courts have repudiated access regulation schemes for
their lack of potency. Lithuania went through the experience. A 1996
ruling by that country's constitutional court was important yet mild. The
court conceded that the Lithuanian guarantee of public access did not reach
certain state secrets.16 But it nevertheless concluded that the legislature failed
adequately to constrain the categories of information that could be withheld
by the executive. 7 The decision therefore shifted more of the responsibility
for generating public access norms from administrators to legislators,
without necessarily enlisting the judiciary in that task.7
b. Declaration of Principle and Legislative Reconsideration
The Hungarian Constitutional Court reached similar results on more
assertive rationales. In 1994, it struck down parts of a lustration law, which
mandated background checks for certain officials but gave them the choice
of resigning to prevent public disclosure. In essence, the court required the
legislature to rebalance access and privacy rights, along with the interest in
"informational self-determination" of those who were spied on.79 The decision
76.

See LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [Constitution] art. 25, para. 5 (Lith.)

(granting citizens the right to "available information which concerns them").
77.
See Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Case 3/96, §§ 1.2, 1.4 (Dec. 19, 1996), available at

http://www.lrkt.t/dokumentai/1996/n6a1219a.htm. See generally Nida Gelazis, Defending Order and
Freedom: The Lithuanian Constitutional Court in Its First Decade, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST
AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 395 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002).

78.

See also Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Case No. Pl. US 11/2000 (July 12,

2001) (as summarized in http://codices.coe.int, indexed as CZE-2001-2-012) (striking down
portions of the Protection of Classified Information Act involving administrative discretion and
denial of security clearances absent independent judicial review); cf. Military Secret Leakage case,
4 KCCR 64, 89Hun-Ka104 (Feb. 25, 1992) (S. Korea) (as described in THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF
THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 142-45 (2001)) (narrowing a criminal statute prohibiting
leaks of "military secrets" to only undisclosed facts, marked classified, the disclosure of which will
pose a clear threat to national security); Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court Standing at the
Crossroads:Focusing on Real Cases and VariationalTypes of Decisions, 24 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 327,328-29, 336-43,357-59 (2002) (noting tools of restraint to help the court survive).
79.
See Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, Decision No. 60/1994 (XII.22) AB
(points 1 & 5), reprinted in 2 E. EURO. CASE RPTR. OFCONST. L. 159,162-63, 169-72,175-76,190-91
(1995); see also Gbor Halmai, Liszl6 Majt6nyi & Kim Lane Scheppele, Confronting the Past: The
Hungarian Constitutional Court's LustrationDecisionof 1994, 1 E. EURO. HUMAN RTS. REV. 111, 118-19
(1995) (describing cases on access to local government meetings and socialist archives).

HeinOnline -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 928 2005-2006

929

Government Secrets

relied on structural logic. "Democratically formed public opinion is an
indispensable, institutional aspect of a constitutional state, and it is thus the

constitutional obligation of the State to provide the conditions for its development and maintenance." At the same time,
[t]his political decision about the precise determination of the range of
information subject to the probe and the range of information to be
deemed personal cannot be based upon the Constitution, but instead
on the constitutional certainty that the records neither can be kept
secret, nor be brought entirely to light."1

In other words, the court was willing to unsettle a political compromise by
invoking constitutional access mandates-yet it refused to write up the
details of a new compromise as a matter of constitutional law. Hungary's
constitution was invoked to restart the political process, but no one indicated
that the document itself was a sufficient source from which the judiciary
alone could engineer a comprehensive public access policy.
In fact, access clauses in constitutional text have not been essential to
judicial action. The Israeli Supreme Court acted without an express charge
in positive law. In 1990, it recognized the principle that coalition agreements, which are practically essential to forming a government in Israel,
must ordinarily be disclosed to the public. The court relied on a structural
feature of representative democracy:
Freedom of public opinion and knowledge of what is happening in the
channels of government are an integral part of a democratic regime,
which is structured on the constant sharing of information about what
is happening in public life with the public itself. Withholding of
information is justifiable only in exceptional cases where security of the
State or foreign relations may be impaired or where there is a risk of
harming some vital public interest."

Yet Israel's decision was like Hungary's in preferring legislative involvement.
The court authorized the Knesset to help regulate the field, establishing the
principle of disclosure but leaving its details to the legislature.83

80.
Decision No. 60/1994, at 173; see id. at 169 ("[Tlhe fundamental right to the freedom of
information presumes that the functioning of the State is transparent to its citizens.").
81.
Id. at 176 (emphasis in original); cf. id. at 177-78 (proceeding to critique the
categories of persons subject to background checks). On this court's procedure and power more
generally, see Georg Brunner, Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian ConstitutionalJudiciary, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT 65, 70, 76-89, 93 (l~szl6 S61yom & Georg Brunner eds., 2000).

82.
83.

HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [1990] lsrSC 44(3) 208, 214; see id. at 218-20 (Barak, .).
See id. at 217.
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c.

Borrowing Rules

Another important example of judicial intervention occurred recently
in India. Official investigations indicated significant connections between
politicians and criminal gangs. India's Supreme Court considered the evidence of corruption, along with proposals by the nation's election commission that would have required legislative candidates to disclose information
regarding criminal proceedings against them and their personal finances.
The court then ordered the commission to mandate a list of disclosures,
with recalcitrant candidates facing removal from the ballot." The court
was, however, unwilling to assume sole responsibility for designing a system
of candidate disclosure: "[W]here there is inaction by the executive, for
whatever reason, the judiciary must.step in, in exercise of its constitutional
obligations to provide a solution," but just until the legislature enacts
"proper legislation to cover the field.""5 Thus, the court forced action while
drawing on the proposals of others and leaving room for supplanting legislation. India may have a weak record of protecting controversial private
speech,8 6 but its courts found a way to encourage a measure of official openness.
3.

Patterns

National constitutions are written and implemented in unique circumstances, and so caution is in order before importing foreign ideas into domestic law. Some of the countries discussed above were recovering from more
authoritarian forms of government when their current constitutions were
adopted. Some faced problems unknown to the United States today, such as
84.
See Union of India v. Ass'n for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294, 19 34, 38, 46, 53
(India) (relying on free speech and democracy to derive a people's/voters' right to get information
about public functionaries).
85.
Id. ' 51. Another Indian decision reached judicial and executive information. The court
in this case ordered disclosure of correspondence between the law minister and the chief justice
pertaining to certain judicial appointments. See S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365,
382-84 (India) (deriving information access claims from textually guaranteed speech rights); see also
Constitutional Court of Latvia, Case No. 04-02(99) (July 6, 1999), http://codices.coe.int/cgi-bin/
om_isapi.dll?clientlD= 176551 7&infobase=codices.nfo&softpage= Doc- FramePg42 (relying in
part on access legislation and international law to invalidate executive action that permitted
government contractors to keep their contracts confidential); Forests Survey Inspection Request
case, 1 KCCR 176, 88Hun-Ma22 (Sept. 4, 1989) (S. Korea) (as described in THE FIRST TEN
YEARS OF THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 78, at 132-34) (deriving selfexecuting access claims from rights of speech, similar to the Indian Supreme Court cases, and holding
that a county violated the constitution by ignoring requests for forest- and property-survey records).
86.
See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, DEMOCRACY IN THE BALANCE: VIOLENCE, HOPE, AND
INDIA'S FUTURE ch. 7 (forthcoming 2006) (discussing efforts to restrain academic publication by
court order).
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the absence of mass media organizations with meaningful independence
from the central government. Their written constitutions sometimes reflect
those challenges without providing obvious lessons for our own system of
public access and state secrecy. It also seems clear that a formally
entrenched and judicially enforceable law of public access is not absolutely
necessary to a legitimate democracy. Great Britain is perhaps the leading
example on this point. That country has no such law yet it has relatively
few problems with legitimacy. Similarly, penciling in public access guarantees does not ensure meaningful government accountability. Uzbekistan's
constitution has a written 8 7access guarantee, but that hardly makes the
country a model democracy.

At the same time, a few salient points can be distilled from foreign
experience. First, information access is commonly seen as a component of a
well-functioning democracy. Whether by textual direction or judicial
inference, whether from outright structural logic or pinned on free speech
principles, numerous countries understand the importance of public
information about government operations. Surely this understanding applies
equally well in the United States. Second, while public access is now often
included in constitutional text, so too is support for access restrictions.
Secrecy, not just openness, is becoming a consensus value. In a strong
sense, secrecy and openness are locations on a single dimension. Both suggest
a ratio of information insiders to information outsiders. Indeed, information
access may entail unhappy tradeoffs, which a nation's fundamental law might
profitably identify. Accordingly, constitutional law in non-U.S. democracies
often reaches the information flow from government to public-sometimes
dictating access, sometimes requiring secrecy, sometimes backed by court
intervention, always involving institutions other than the judiciary.
This last observation about institutional collaboration is the third lesson
from foreign experience, and it is worth emphasizing. When pressing for
reform, foreign courts have been gentle. They avoid the strain of wholesale
system design in favor of more limited tools: demanding clarity in nonconstitutional rules; declaring general principles on which action must follow;
identifying substantial system deficiencies without mandating exclusive
87.
See KONSTITUSIYA [Constitution] art. 30 (Uzb.); BANISAR, supra note 57, at 95-96
(noting access restrictions); Adrian Karatnycky, The 2003 Freedom House Survey: National Income
and Liberty, 15 J. DEM. 82, 91 (2004) (rating Uzbekistan at or near the bottom of a seven-point
scale for political rights and civil liberties); see also K.S. Venkateswaran, India: National Security, Freedom
of Expression and Emergency Powers, in SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 321, 329-31 (Sandra Coliver et al. eds., 1999)
(asserting a culture of secrecy in India's bureaucracy).
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solutions; and borrowing proposals fashioned elsewhere to provide at least
interim relief. All of this helps mark the outline of a balanced and multiinstitutional approach to information access problems.

II.

OUR UNEASY ORDER

In some ways the text of the U.S. Constitution is obviously different
from the foreign law just canvassed. As discussed in more detail below, the
document lacks a general-purpose public access provision, a special procedure
for enacting laws affecting public access, or an explicit obligation to pass
such legislation.8" It also lacks a clause governing secrecy in the executive
branch. Yet the United States shares a democratic structure with the
countries discussed above. Informed public discussion about government
operations is no less important here. In addition, our federal courts have
become as active and as effective as any. Absence of explicit constitutional
authorization for judicial intervention has not been a complete bar to U.S.
court action in other areas. Finding intervention on access issues, therefore, would not be surprising.

88.
Contrast the following state constitutional provisions regarding executive-held
information: CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3(b) (adopted in 2004 by initiative) (establishing a public
access right "to information concerning the conduct of the people's business," an interpretive rule
favoring access that applies to existing and new laws, and a requirement that new limitations be
accompanied by findings of need, but shielding privacy protections and otherwise grandfathering
in current law); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a)-(c) (establishing a right to inspect "any public record"
and opening certain executive branch meetings, while permitting exemptions only after a twothirds vote in both houses, only if such legislation "state[s] with specificity the public necessity
justifying the exemption," and only if it is "no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated
purpose of the law"); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3 ("No person shall be denied the right to observe the
deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by
law."); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and
its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the
merits of public disclosure."); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 6 ("Unless otherwise provided by law, all records
of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, or agencies of the state or any political
subdivision of the state, or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public finds or
expending public finds, shall be public .... "). The New Hampshire Constitution provides:
All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all the magistrates
and officers of government are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable
to them.
Government, therefore, should be open, accessible, accountable and
responsive. To that end, the public's right of access to governmental proceedings and
records shall not be unreasonably restricted.
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 8.
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A. Partial Constitutionalizing
As it turns out, U.S. courts have been reluctant to dictate access to
information about the federal executive branch as a matter of constitutional
law. But as foreign law suggests, openness is not the only relevant norm.
Secrecy might be part of constitutional law, too. In fact, our courts recognize some constitutional protection for executive discretion to withhold
information. Adding this component to the formal system for evaluating
public access claims alters the mix of information it can produce, and allows
a kind of reasoning that isdifficult to contain.
1.

Spheres of Executive Discretion

Our courts protect government secrets with constitutional law, and for
good reason. Effective executive power and the president's success as commander-in-chief sometimes depend on discretion to withhold information
from general circulation. Deliberation, diplomacy, and military victory can
be jeopardized when the executive cannot control information.89 Federal
constitutional law meets these concerns in two ways. First, the president
has inherent authority to restrict access to sensitive information, as when
disclosure would threaten legitimate national security interests. Congressional authorization is unnecessary before the president takes action to limit
access to such data. 90 Second, courts are willing to insulate certain executive
decisions to maintain secrecy despite the contrary wishes of other institutions. An executive decision in this field is sometimes final and supreme.
a. Executive Privilege
The first case worth considering ended badly for the president but not
for the presidency. In United States v. Nixon,9' the Supreme Court affirmed
the denial of the president's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum and
rejected his argument for an absolute executive privilege. That prerogative
would have afforded presidents judicially unreviewable discretion to withhold their confidential communications with advisors. 92 The Court also
held that the special prosecutor had adequately demonstrated sufficient
89.
See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21
(1936) (recognizing virtues of executive secrecy in foreign affairs).
90.
See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).

91.
92.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
See id. at 703-07.
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need for in camera inspection of the recordings and documents in question, in
view of the president's reliance on a "generalized interest in confidentiality." 93
Yet the Nixon case did an important favor for presidential power. It validated a qualified executive privilege to withhold information, and it planted
that privilege in constitutional law.94 This conclusion was easily avoidable by
arguendo assumptions.95 The Court was making a special effort to add
constitutional protection for the executive. Furthermore, the Court openly
conceded that constitutional text was inadequate to establish executive
privilege for confidential communications. 96
And the opinion hardly
9
mentioned historical materials. " The logic for a presumptive constitutional
privilege instead was practical and structural: The efficacy of the presidency
can be undermined by the speech-dampening effect of unrestricted access to
presidential communications with staff.99 "Nowhere in the Constitution... is
there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent
this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is
constitutionally based."'
Just how far executive privilege should extend is contested. Aside
from the uncertainty generated by qualified tests of any kind, there is controversy over the constitutionally required scope of the privilege. Several
access restrictions can be broken out from that general heading. They
include protection for presidential communications (at least between the
president and his closest advisors), deliberative process not involving the
93.

Id. at 713; see also id. at 707; id. at 710 (noting that the president did not argue that

military or diplomatic secrets would be disclosed).

94.

See id. at 705-06, 708, 711-13. For some critical commentary, see RAOUL

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).

BERGER,

For a defense of executive privilege

in some form, see MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 142-57 (1994).

95.
Cf. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 697-98 (discussing the limits of Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and citing the constitutional avoidance canon in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
96.
See id. at 711; see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998)
(stating that Nixon dealt with a privilege unknown to the common law); David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1741-44 (2003) (arguing that
Nixon is an example of constitutional text fading when the issue becomes more important).
97.
See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705 n. 15 (noting that the Constitutional Convention was closed).
98.
See id. at 705-06 & n.16 (indicating that a privilege for presidential communications
"flow[s]" from enumerated powers, per McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819));
id. at 708 (underscoring the value of candor). Whether presidential control over the privilege is a net
good has been debated. See 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5673, at 13, 39 (1992). For an empirical study
of evidentiary privileges, see Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney Client Privilege: A
Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191 (1989).
99.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
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president himself, state or military secrets, and confidential sources." Likewise unsettled is whether the scope of executive privilege should change
when Congress demands information for itself. In any event, federal courts
are willing to afford the executive qualified constitutional protection from
information demands.
b. FACA and Presidential Advisors
Judicial perception of institutional need supports secrecy beyond
claims of executive privilege. It also affects statutory construction, especially when presidential advisors or classified information would be exposed.
As to the former, courts have ensured minimum interference from the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA). That statute covers certain otherwise
private groups that are "established or utilized" by the president or a federal
agency to get advice."' These groups are supposed to be regulated in several
ways. FACA requires that they hold open meetings unless the executive
determines that closure comports with the Government in the Sunshine
Act; it mandates notice of meetings and meeting minutes; and it subjects
the group's records to FOIA.02
In Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,03 the Supreme
Court considered whether the American Bar Association's federal judiciary
committee was "utilized" by the executive within the meaning of FACA.
Using the word's common meaning, it was hard to say no. For decades, the
Justice Department had asked for and received the ABA's investigationbacked advice regarding potential nominees. Essentially conceding the textual point, the majority instead condemned the lay reading using other
100.

See generally 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-15,

at 770-71 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing historical and modem varieties of executive privilege); 26 WRIGHT
& GRAHAM, supra note 98, § 5664, at 612 (reviewing state secrets privilege definitions in case
law). See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (recognizing a qualified privilege
for police informants but rejecting its use on the facts); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10
(1953) (indicating limits on in camera court review in state secrets cases); Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Dep't of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (distinguishing deliberative process
from presidential communications privilege).
See 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(B)-(C) (2000); see also id. § 4(b)-(c); Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
101.
Clinton, 76 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)-(c). See generally 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL
102.
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 24, at 493-544 (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2005). For an argument that
Congress cannot constitutionally regulate presidential advisory committees that do not receive
federal appropriations, see Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994). FACA's application to agency as opposed to
presidential advisors is a separate matter.
491 U.S. 440 (1989).
103.
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sources (including the executive's pre-FACA practice under its own executive orderS"), and ultimately relied on a canon of constitutional avoidance
to "tip[ ] the balance decisively""' in favor of nondisclosure. Justice
Kennedy's concurrence went further, resting solely on constitutional
ground: "The mere fact that FACA would regulate so as to interfere with
the manner in which the President obtains information necessary to discharge his duty assigned under the Constitution to nominate federal judges
is enough to invalidate the Act [as applied here]."'"
Public Citizen might be unimportant standing alone. Constitutional concern centered on the textually explicit presidential nomination power-and
the case touched on a process that the justices themselves had survived.'
But sympathy for advisory confidences runs deeper and includes simple
policy advice.
Cheney v. District Court'" helps make the argument. Judicial Watch
and the Sierra Club sought information about an energy policy task force.
The task force was authorized by the president to develop a national energy
policy, chaired by the vice president, and populated by federal government
employees. But plaintiffs alleged that lobbyists participated as if they were
full-fledged members of the group, and thus their closed meetings had violated FACA.' 9 Plaintiffs needed evidence of that private influence, however; so the issue was whether discovery into "de facto membership" would
violate the Constitution. The district court permitted discovery without
narrowing upfront the plaintiffs' broad requests, while allowing the executive
to raise particularized privilege objections." Mandamus was denied in the
D.C. Circuit, which relied on the district court to restrain the plaintiffs."'
The Supreme Court stepped in and chastised the appellate court for
underestimating its authority to act swiftly." 2 Availability of specific privilege
104.
See id. at 456-57 (discussing Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. 573 (1959-1963)).
105.
Id. at 465; see also id. at 455, 466.
106.
Id. at 488-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
107.
Records involving the appointment process for the Supreme Court were not plainly at
issue, though. See id. at 443,444 n.1, 447-48 (majority opinion).
108.
542 U.S. 367 (2004).
109.
See id. at 373. The General Accounting Office was tasked by certain members of
Congress with investigating the group, but it did not receive all of the information it sought. See
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENERGY TASK FORCE: PROCESS USED TO DEVELOP THE NATIONAL
ENERGY POLICY (2003) (GAO-03-894), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/203894.pdf.
110.
See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 54-55
(D.D.C. 2002).
111.
See In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (recognizing that plaintiffs
only needed documents on nonfederal official participants).
112.
See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 376-77, 391.
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objections was no bar to immediate consideration of a broader effort to
immunize presidential advisors from exposure. "As this case implicates the
separation of powers, the Court of Appeals must ... ask.., whether the
District Court's actions constituted an unwarranted impairment of another
branch in the performance of its constitutional duties.'.. The Supreme
Court must have seen some merit in the constitutional objection, at least
when raised by the vice president against a relatively unrestrained discovery
request in civil litigation.' 4 A small question is why the majority was
unwilling to compel issuance of mandamus outright, rather than remanding.
After all, the Court believed that "[tihe Executive Branch, at its highest
level, [was] seeking the aid of the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives."... But the executive did not have to wait long for victory. Now
reading the statute narrowly in light of "severe separation-of-powers problems," on remand the en banc D.C. Circuit issued mandamus directing dismissal of the complaint."6
c. FOIA and National Security
National security information likewise triggers judicial modesty.
7
Consider cases under Exemption 1 of FOIA," which permits the executive
to withhold classified documents from the public. The statutory text is startling. The records withheld must be not just marked classified, but in fact
properly classified pursuant to executive order;"' the executive bears the
burden of proving that they are; and the judiciary must perform de novo
9
review, with authority to examine documents in camera." Bear in mind
Id. at 390.
113.
See id. at 384-90 (stressing such points to distinguish Nixon); see also id. at 385
114.
(indicating that impairing private FACA suits would not impair "Article III authority or
Congress' central Article I powers"); id. at 375, 390-91 (noting that the district court itself had
been asked by plaintiffs to wield mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) to enforce FACA,
which lacks an obvious private right of action).
Id. at 385; see id. at 391 (noting the appellate court truncated its analysis by
115.
misapplying Nixon, and that no original writ had been requested from the Supreme Court).
In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
116.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
117.
See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003). The order forbids classification to,
118.
for instance, "conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error." Id. at 200. Note
that records may be withheld even if they are classified upon a FOIA request. See 1 O'REILLY,
supra note 102, § 11.31, at 550-52.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) ("[FOIA] does not apply to matters that are... (A)
119.
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order."); id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (mandating de novo review, authorizing in camera
inspection, and placing the burden of justification on the agency).
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what it means for information to be "in fact properly classified." Under the
current order, information should be marked "Confidential" (the lowest
classification level) if its unauthorized disclosure "reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe."'20 This is the predictive
judgment that purportedly must be made, de novo, by federal courts. And
nearly anyone may request documents under FOIA."'
FOIA's aggressive message was no scrivener's error. Before the statute
was so clear, the Supreme Court had scoffed at the idea of courts parsing
and second-guessing classification decisions. In EPA v. Mink,'22 the Court
called it "wholly untenable."'' 3 There the Court turned aside an attempt by
Representative Patsy Mink and other House members to obtain information
about a possible nuclear weapons test. The press had reported disagreement
about the test among administration officials; plaintiffs wanted that debate
more fully disclosed. But the executive offered an affidavit listing relevant
documents and attesting that most had been duly classified.' 4 Even though
FOIA commanded de novo review, the case was closed on those documents.
Justice Stewart wrote separately to place responsibility on Congress for
writing a weak statute. As he read FOIA, Congress "chose ... to decree
blind acceptance of Executive fiat," despite the risk that ignorance would
"paralyze[ ]" the democratic process in this dispute.'25
Such "blind acceptance" was incompatible with the politics of the
late-Nixon period. A year after Mink and over the new president's veto,
Congress responded.'26 The 1974 FOIA amendments seemed to enact the
scheme thought unimaginable by the Court. The new statute left the general
120.
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196, 197 (2003).
121.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (referring to "any person"). But see id. § 552(a)(3)(E)(i)-(ii)
(Supp. 2002) (prohibiting intelligence agencies from disclosing records to foreign governments and
their representatives).
122.
410 U.S. 73 (1973) (denying the court of appeals the authority to conduct in camera
document review).
123.
Id. at 84.
124.
See id. at 76-77 & n.3, 81, 84. At that time, Exemption 1 referred to matters
"specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national
defense or
foreign policy." Id. at 81. The executive also invoked Exemption 5, which protects certain
nondiscoverable memoranda. See id. at 85-94.
125.
Id. at 95 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 94 (noting that no constitutional
question was at issue). Then-Justice Rehnquist did not participate. Two justices concurred in
part and dissented in part. One justice dissented.
126.
See The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 12471
Without His Approval, 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974); 1 O'REILLY, supra
note 102, § 11:3, at 510-11, § 11:4, at 513-15 (suggesting the political atmosphere of Watergate
made Congress hostile to "national security" justifications for secrecy and confident in the judiciary).
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de novo review provision in place, then added authority for in camera
review, a duty to segregate nonexempt portions of records, and the "in fact
properly classified" clause.'27 Congress was enlisting the judiciary's help in
checking executive control over classified information.
Yet little has changed.'28 The Supreme Court left Exemption 1 cases
to the lower courts about twenty-five years ago,' and they have been
friendly to the executive ever since, relying in part on a passage from legislative history.' Ordinarily the executive's judgment will be deferred to and
trusted, and procedures involving executive affidavits and document indexes
Essentially the government
are used to avoid actual document review.'
must articulate a logical basis for classification. When logic is lacking in
the executive's arguments, the normal response is to give the government
In fact, it is unclear whether a court has ever successfully
another try.'
See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1(b)(2), 2(a), (c), 88 Stat.
127.
1561-64 (1974) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b)(1), and adding a sentence regarding
segregable portions of documents to § 552(b)).
See generally Cheh, supra note 9, at 730; Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De
128.
in Litigation Over National Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act,
Review
Novo
37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 82-86 (1992); Wells, supra note 36, at 1205-08.
See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1981) (holding
129.
that the military did not have to prepare and release an environmental impact assessment that
would be covered by Exemption 1); cf. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 180-81 (1985) (extending
Exemption 3 to intelligence sources who were not promised confidentiality, thereby relieving the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from satisfying the requirements of Exemption 1).
The relevant passage reads:
130.
ITIhe conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for national
defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse effects might
occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly, the
conferees expect that Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in [Exemption 11
cases under [FOIA], will accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning
the details of the classified status of the disputed record.
CONF. REP. No. 93-1200 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6290. 1996 amendments
did add an oblique reference to courts giving "substantial weight" to agency decisions, although
without specifying classification decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (as amended by Freedom
of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 104-23 1, § 6, 110 Stat. 3050 (1996)) ("In addition to any other
matters to which a court accords substantial weight, a court shall accord substantial weight to an
affidavit of an agency concerning the agency's determination as to technical feasibility under
paragraph (2)(C) and subsection (b) and reproducibility under paragraph (3)(B).") (emphasis
added). For helpful context from the procourt perspective, see Deyling, supra note 128, at 70-82.
See, e.g., Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 292 (2d Cit. 1999); Hayden v. Nat'l Sec.
131.
Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that in camera review isneither
necessary nor appropriate once the government submits adequately specific affidavits-absent
contrary evidence or evidence of bad faith); FRANCK, supra note 21, at 142-43. But cf. CONF. REP.
No. 93-1200, supranote 130, at 9 (suggesting an affidavit process to demonstrate that documents are
"clearly exempt" before in camera review, which would be necessary "in many situations").
See John A. Bourdeau, Annotation, What Matters Are Exempt From Disclosure Under
132.
of
Freedom Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1)), 169 A.L.R. FED. 495, 515 (2001).
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commanded the production of documents withheld under Exemption 1"'
The suggestions for modifying the legislation in President Ford's veto
message are, ironically, a good summation of post-1974 practice:
[W]here classified documents are requested the courts could review
the classification, but would have to uphold the classification if there
is a reasonable basis to support it. In determining the reasonableness
of the classification, the courts would consider all attendant evidence
prior to resorting to an in camera examination of the document.'34

This judicial behavior is not explained by modifications to the relevant Executive Order. Courts did this on their own. Nor is the behavior
an automatic step from practical institutional constraints.

An expertise

gap can be narrowed by appointing an independent expert witness,135 a
technical advisor,"' or a special master 137 with security clearance. But apparently the judiciary is not excited by the idea of developing national
security expertise.
This does not mean FOIA is ineffectual. Statutes can affect decisions
far upstream from litigation." 8 Knowing that a court will ask for an
explanation might prompt the executive to release documents based on the
simple prospect of suit. There seems to be consensus that the executive
habitually overclassifies as an initial matter,' 39 and maybe FOIA never had

133.
See id. at 514-15; see also Deyling, supra note 128, at 67, 82, 86-87.
134.
The President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 12471 Without
His Approval, supra note 126, at 1318; cf. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES, S. Doc. NO. 82,
at 189 (2d Sess. 1974) (noting a rejected Senate Judiciary Committee version that would have
limited judicial review to "reasonable basis").
135.
See FED. R. EVID. 706.
136.
Cf. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 203 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding
inherent and statutory authority to appoint an advisor to tutor the court on fishery questions).
137.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 53; Deyling, supra note 128, at 105-11 (advocating use of special
masters, along with document sampling, at least in cases involving a large volume of records).
138.
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 656 (1985) (discussing how the prospect of judicial review influences behavior).
139.
See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. app. at 36-37 (1997) (statement
of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (discussing the need to reexamine Cold War inspired secrecy
programs); Too Many Secrets: Overclassificationas a Barrier to Critical Information Sharing: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Emerging Threats & Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 108th Cong. 1-2 (2004) (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays); id. at 23 ("It is no secret
that the government classifies too much information.") (statement of J. William Leonard,
Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records Administration).
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a chance to prevent that behavior.'" Nevertheless, FOIA requests and
41
even gentle versions of judicial review can make a positive difference.'
2.

Quixotic Access Norms

Rarely have courts held that federal constitutional law points in the
other direction, toward public access.'42 There is unsettled territory here,
however. Recent disputes over the executive's conduct of the war on terrorism exposed disagreement in the lower courts. This conflict was partly
due to an absence of guidance on public access to the executive branch.
Supreme Court treatment of constitutional access claims does not squarely
address that question. Instead, the development of these cases can be
divided into three stages: no access, court access, and silence.
a.

No Constitutionally Compelled Access?

Around the same time executive privilege and secrecy in the name of
national security hit the judicial agenda, the Supreme Court decided some
information access claims grounded in constitutional law. The claimants
typically asserted First Amendment rights, and not without reason. "Speech"
and "press" refer to communication, which is a social process. One can
logically read the Amendment as promoting a system of communication" in
which audiences possess interests in parity with speakers. In fact, the Court
1
had long accepted listeners' First Amendment interests. " And the judiciary
was indicating that "political speech" and "robust" debate on "public issues"
' The trick for claimants was overcoming
were at the core of its concerns.
Not without a more meaningful penalty provision, anyway. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)
140.
(2000) (permitting assessment of attorney fees against the United States); id. § 552(a)(4)(F)
(calling for investigation of and possible disciplinary action against an employee for suspected
arbitrary or capricious withholding, if records were ordered disclosed); id. § 552(a)(4)(G)
(authorizing contempt penalties against employees if a court order is disobeyed).
See Deyling, supra note 128, at 110-11 (providing an example).
141.
See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (2d ed. 2002) ("Thus, it seems clear
142.
that the government can generally restrict access to its own documents .... "); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-4, at 814 n.36 (2d ed. 1988); id. § 12-20, at 955.
See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (1970).
143.
See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
144.
756-57 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 143 (1943); cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stressing
audience interests and upholding a right-of-reply regulation in broadcasting).
See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) ("[Tlhere is practically universal
145.
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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the objections of unwilling speakers.
An audience might have a
constitutionally respected interest in receiving information about their
government, but that might not include information from or facilitated by
their government.'46 The early access cases saw just this distinction and
produced a short string of government victories.
Foreshadowing of this line came with the Supreme Court's holding that
the executive was not obliged to permit foreign travel to Cuba for a personal
fact-finding mission. This holding did not directly resolve questions about
access to U.S. government-held information, and it could be limited by the
countervailing concerns of foreign policy and border control. But the Court
went further in situations involving domestic prisons.
Despite the
significance of newsgathering activities to recognized constitutional values,
journalists were denied face-to-face access to inmates of their choosing.4 '
Justice Stewart frowned on the idea that "the Constitution imposes upon
government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of
information not available to members of the public generally.'1 49 The
culminating case in this set is Houchirns v. KQED, Inc.," which denied press
access to locations in a jail that were off-limits to the rest of the public. At one
point, the plurality put it bluntly and broadly: "Neither the First Amendment
nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government
information or sources of information within the government's control."'5
If one were so inclined, Houchins and the like could be waved away
because the Court was largely preoccupied with the question whether "the
press" was entitled to greater access than others,' 2 or because the Court was
placing special limits on judicial interference with the physical management
of government facilities, particularly prisons, ' or even because the
146.
Cf. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 756 ("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.").
147.
See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,3-4, 16-17 (1965) (pointing to a problem of claimant
insincerity); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 759-60, 769-70 (1972) (rejecting
professors' First Amendment challenge to the executive's denial of a visa to a Belgian advocate of
communism, where Congress had delegated power to exclude aliens and the executive could
provide "a facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the exclusion).
148.
See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817,
830-32, 834-35 (1974) (stressing parity in treatment with the rest of the public, and alternative
means of obtaining information).
149.
Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; see aLso Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
150.
438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion).
151.
Id. at 15. On the other hand, Justice Stewart's crucial concurrence required special
accommodations for the press when they enter spaces already open. See id. at 16-19 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Three justices dissented, stressing their opposition to total denial of public access to
information about jail operations. See id. at 29-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152.
See id. at 7 (plurality opinion) ("[Tihey argue for an implied special right of access.
153.
See id. at 8 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
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claimant relied on the First Amendment rather than a structural argument
about democracy.' A broader message was nevertheless difficult to ignore.
b. The Puzzling Case of Court Access
Then the message became mixed. In four cases decided over six years,
the Supreme Court established that criminal trial proceedings ordinarily
must be open to the public. 55 Despite the language in Houchins, the majority in these cases relied on the First Amendment and democratic theory.
Access to criminal trials promotes an informed discussion of governmental
affairs, which in turn might "ensure that the individual citizen can effectively
56
participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government."'
And the presumption of access is strong. It is not enough for the defendant,
the prosecutor, and the trial judge to agree on closure. Closed criminal
proceedings are unconstitutional "unless specific, on the record findings are
made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'5 7 Closure was rejected, as a matter
of constitutional law, in all four cases. Nor have court access claims been
limited to criminal trials. Aside from certain other aspects of criminal
prosecution,' lower courts have extended presumptive public access to civil
judicial proceedings. 9

Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality
154.
opinion) (relying on the First Amendment shortly after similar arguments were rejected in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,443 U.S. 368 (1979) (focusing on the Sixth Amendment)); id. at 584-85
(Brennan, J., concurring).
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-EnterpriseII) (involving the
155.
sealed transcript of a pretrial preliminary hearing); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984) (Press-Enterprise I) (arising from defense- and prosecution-supported motions to close most of
voir dire and seal the transcript thereof); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982) (involving a state statute mandating closure during the testimony of children who are
alleged victims of certain sex crimes). See Richmond Newsp., 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion)
(arising from the defendant's motion to close his entire criminal trial, which was unopposed by the
prosecution); accord El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993) (addressing a rule
that closed probable cause hearings unless the defendant requested otherwise).
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
156.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Globe
157.
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07 ("Where ... the State attempts to deny the right of access in order
to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated
by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.").
See, e.g., Wash. Post Co. v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing
158.
a presumptive right of access to plea agreements).
See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-70 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil
159.
trials); Lauren Gilbert, When Democracy Dies Behind Closed Doors: The First Amendment and
"Special Interest" Hearings, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 759 & n.105 (2003) (collecting cases).
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These decisions might not conflict with Houchins. In them, the Court
relied on a long tradition-stretching back to the Norman Conquest--of
public access to criminal trials. The same cannot be said for prisons or jails.
On the other hand, these cases combined tradition with good policy: the idea
that access would enhance the legitimacy and quality of judicial proceedings."6 It is not known whether a less lengthy tradition (a century? fifty
years?) bars presumptive rights of access if the policy justification is persuasive.
There is reason to think that the broader access claim was on the table
after Richmond Newspapers.6 ' In certain respects, the court access victories
came in the least likely of places. Criminal trials raise legitimate fears about
the influence of popular opinion. It is always possible that restrictions on state
power posed by procedural and substantive law will weaken in the face of
populist scrutiny, especially when their theoretical systemic value is confronted
by the concrete needs of the state in its effort to convict an identified defendant.
Even if one believes that the criminal justice system was too insulated from
popular sentiment, it is unclear why the need for popular pressure was greater
in the courtrooms of the 1980s than anywhere else in American government.
The court access cases suggested that a larger principle might be established.
c.

Silence and Some Confusion

But that move toward a larger principle was not made, at least not in
the Supreme Court. The Court essentially has been silent on the matter
for over a decade.'62 Not surprisingly, lower courts have generated some
disagreement over access to executive information and operations.
Several courts refuse to push the constitutional law of access beyond federal
courts regulating themselves and the state courts. 163 Still, that view
160. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
161.
Richmond Newsp., 448 U.S. 555; see supra note 155.
162.
A limited exception is Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing
Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), holding that a for-profit publishing company could not assert a facial
challenge to a state law that demanded a promise of noncommercial use before disclosing arrestee
addresses. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion did state that "California could decide not to give
out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Id. at 40.
163.
See, e.g., ACLU of Miss. v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1070-72 (5th Cit. 1990)
(denying complete public access to Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission records when pitted
against constitutional privacy concerns); Calder v. IRS, 890 F.2d 781, 783-84 (5th Cit. 1989)
(denying access to Al Capone's tax records); cf. JB Pictures, Inc. v. Dep't of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 239
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding a policy denying public access for viewing the arrival of deceased
soldiers at Dover Air Force Base, which was adopted shortly before Operation Desert Storm,
although assuming that judicial balancing was allowed); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797
F.2d 1164 (3d Cit. 1986) (en banc) (rejecting a claim of access to files of a state environmental
agencybut vindicating a claim of unequal access).
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is not unanimous,' 6' and several lower courts are willing to consider
access arguments on the merits of individual cases.
A sharp conflict emerged when the executive closed hundreds of "special interest" deportation proceedings to the public. The people subject to
these proceedings were assertedly connected to the government's 9/11
investigation (although support for terrorism was certainly not the only
basis for deportation). Because of the alleged connection between confidentiality and the needs of effective law enforcement, immigration policy,
and national security, a fair prediction might have been a clear government
victory. But the Sixth Circuit split with the Third,'65 and the Supreme
Court denied review.1 6 In the final analysis, the government's arguments
for secrecy and the plaintiffs arguments for access both suffered from critical weaknesses. For example, outsiders had some access to these detainees
and knew that the proceedings were going on because the detainees were
not held incommunicado; because they were not held incommunicado, it
was difficult to see how much the executive gained by closing the hearings.
The lesson here is not about that particular controversy, however,
but that
67
claims.1
access
executive
in
interest
judicial
there is renewed

164.
See Whiteland Woods, LP. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 180-81 (3d Cit. 1999)
(dicta regarding access to local planning board meetings); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. Dep't of Agriculture,
960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (using constitutional doubt in a case about access to a list of
voters within an agricultural marketing order); Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F.
Supp. 569, 573, 576-79 (D. Utah 1985) (requiring access to formal agency fact-finding hearings
to investigate a mining disaster), appeal dismissed and remanded by, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th Cit. 1987);
cf. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244-45 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(granting a preliminary injunction against the total denial of television access to pool coverage of
White House events and presidential activities-an action taken by the White House to force
plaintiffs into reaching their own rotation agreement); Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City of
Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186-87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (regarding arrest records).
165.
For what it's worth, more federal judges voted to reject closure in the absence of
(additional) determinations that secrecy was needed. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of access), rev'd,
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cit. 2002) (2-1 vote), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003); Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of
access), affd, 303 F.3d 681, 711 (6th Cit. 2002) (3-0 vote) ("Open proceedings, with a vigorous
and scrutinizing press, serve to ensure the durability of our democracy."). Plus, the Third Circuit
conceded that the experience and policy inquiry of the court access cases applied to these
executive proceedings. It rested its decision on the narrower ground that the district court had
underplayed the executive's national security concerns. See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 200-01.
166.
The executive opposed certiorari, partly on the ground that it was deporting these
people so quickly that the case was about to lose practical significance. See Brief for Respondents
in Opposition at 9-10, N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (No. 02-1289).
167.
Cf. ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 504-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (ordering
certain executive agencies to respond to eleven-month-old FOIA requests for documents
regarding post-9/1 1 detainees; relying on the purposes of the Act).
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d.

Leaks and Confidential News Sources

There are other pockets of constitutional law affecting information
access. The courts are usually happy to protect the dissemination of truthful
information about the government by those unaffiliated with the government. Attempts to halt such dissemination by either subsequent punishment or prior restraint are extremely difficult to justify in court.16s Hence, the
media's swift victory in the PentagonPapers case could not be more different
from the delicate and deferential treatment of national security concerns
just one year later in EPA v. Mink. Granted, there must be limits to this
immunity. Combat plans, weapons technology, and the identity of secret
agents are almost certainly in a class of their own."' No one believes that
prosecuting true spies poses any constitutional difficulty. Otherwise, and as
a matter of First Amendment law, information ordinarily may flow freely
after it escapes the executive's efforts to withhold it. This protection
reduces the threat of legal sanction against mass media and others who
traffic in information about government, and should make them more
interested in acquiring it.
But this immunity for dissemination is not necessarily immunity for
disclosure. Will executive officials be as interested in revealing information
as outsiders will be in asking for it? The answer is often yes, as evidenced by
regular reliance on unnamed sources in news reports."' Law plays some role
here. True, insiders might disclose information purely on conscience or
spite and regardless of other consequences. For other officials, however,
legal protection may coax them into providing information to outsiders. For
example, government employees possess modest First Amendment protection from certain kinds of adverse employment action-"Public concern"
168.

See, e.g., Landmark Commc'n, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (regarding

subsequent punishment); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
(concerning prior restraint, despite asserted national security concerns).
169.
See generally Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283-85 (1981) (involving exposure of foreign CIA
agents and passport revocation); United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.
1979) (involving nuclear technology and a preliminary injunction); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 905-12.

170.

A

NEWS MEDIA

recent survey is PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE
2004: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2004) (content analysis

with
tables
and
charts),
http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/
of
newspapers
narrative_newspaperscontentanalysis.asp?cat=2&media=2 (reporting that 45 percent of sampled
front-page stories from sixteen selected newspapers in 2003 included at least one unnamed source).
A study by the Center for Media and Public Affairs found that use of anonymous sources was less
frequent in 2001 compared to 1981 in network newscasts and the front-page stories of six selected
newspapers. See Ctr. for Media & Pub. Affairs, Study Finds Big Drop in Anonymous Sourcing: "Off the

Record" Quotes Down by 113 Since Reagan Years (May 30, 2005), available at http://www.cmpa.com
(reporting a 33 percent decline).
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for the information disclosed may overcome any legitimate government
interest in punishing the employee. 7 ' If a civil servant publicly discloses
legal violations or gross mismanagement, then she might have statutory
Furthermore, leaky officials
protection from adverse personnel action.'
can attempt to evade detection by those who would oppose disclosure.
Current legal rules may help in this regard. Journalists sometimes enjoy a
' while the First
privilege against revelation of their confidential sources, 73
Amendment does not bar civil suits against those who break promises to
maintain source confidentiality.'74
These rules are important in their own right, but they are not a substitute for a substantive law of public access. One critique is that current rules
Government
insufficiently protect insiders and their media outlets.'
employees must be willing to risk professional, personal, and reputational
injury,'7 6 without guarantee that they will be rewarded adequately according
to the public benefit produced by disclosure. A second concern persists
even when government sources are fully immunized from retaliation. In
171.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983) (indicating deferential balancing).
172.
See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a), (h)-(i) (2000) (authorizing employees to seek relief from the
Merit Systems Protection Board, with judicial review); id. § 2302(a)(2)(B), (B)(ii) (describing
covered employees, who do not include those exempted by the president); id. § 2302(b)(8)
(describing protected disclosures, which do not include public revelation of classified information).
The law of "reporter's privilege" is complicated. The Supreme Court rejected a First
173.
Amendment privilege for journalists in the grand jury context more than thirty years ago. See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); cf. id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). But since
then, most states enacted shield laws which apply in state judicial proceedings and federal
diversity jurisdiction, see Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial: State
Courts' Interpretationof the journalist'sStatutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 217 & nn.17-18 (1997)
(collecting statutes and noting additional protection from state courts); FED. R. EVID. 501, and
many lower federal courts have recognized a qualified privilege as a matter of First Amendment
law, or under their authority to generate privileges in the Rules of Evidence, or both. See, e.g.,
Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 713, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); see also infra Part IllI.C.1. There is
no simple restatement that captures the substance of these various sources of law.
174.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-71 (1991).
175.
See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (endorsing a
constructive trust on profits from a former agent's book, which was not prescreened by the CIA-even
though the government did not contend that classified information was disclosed); Barnard v.
Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (8th Cit. 1995) (doubting a public employee's First
Amendment right to leak information, and denying it to a county auditor); Cheh, supra note 9, at
701-02, 709, 712,719.
176.
See Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The first amendment
neither guarantees that a whistle-blower can engage in a cost-free exercise of his right of free
expression, nor requires appellees to guarantee good feelings at all times between employees."); see
also U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BD., THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
RESULTS OF THE MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2000, at 35 (2003) (reporting that 44 percent of
respondents who had made disclosures regarding misconduct or dangers felt that they were then
retaliated against or threatened with retaliation); Family of Iraq Abuse Whistleblower Threatened,
REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2004, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/ 0816-03.htm.
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this informal system of public access, reporters must be willing to build close
relationships with government officials. Such nonadversarial interaction
leads to risks of officials co-opting and manipulating news coverage for their
personal or political objectives.
This issue points to the most fundamental problem. Informal systems
of public access are unambitious. They lack a normative standard for judging
when disclosure is appropriate, either in individual cases or overall.'77 The
mix of information will reflect a confluence of incentives and opportunities,
some of which will be temporary and unpredictable, none of which are
calibrated to a standard of socially desirable openness or secrecy. Disclosure
will be driven by the individual judgment of government employees-acting on motivations such as vanity and intrabranch factional warfare,' 78 as
well as their subjective estimation of the public good-with additional
filtering by those offered the information for distribution. We would not
have to worry about differing individual standards if this system disclosed to
the public all information about government operations. But it will not,
and we would not want it to.
There is one proper purpose for which informal channels of disclosure
are uniquely suited: combating deep secrecy.' 79 Sometimes information outsiders are too ignorant to know that relevant information is being concealed. Even formulating the right questions may require assistance from
an insider. Once suspicions arise, nonjudicial pressure might achieve a
swift, inexpensive, and appropriate degree of public access. But no pressure
point in the executive branch can be exploited without reason to believe
that there is more to know.' s° Investigative reporting, source confidentiality,
and the law that protects them are therefore important components in an
acceptable system of public access. They should not be the only components.
B.

Unsatisfying Defenses

This state of affairs presents a few puzzles. Our constitutional law, as
declared by our courts, affects public access to government information.
Sometimes it speaks to the subject directly. And yet on other occasions
177.

This point was argued forcefully in Sunstein, supra note 11, at 902-03.

178.

See STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 75-94 (1984); HEDRICK

SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS 432-37 (1988).
179.
See supra note 41 (distinguishing deep from shallow secrets).
180.
Disclosure to internal investigatory groups, such as an Office of Inspector General,
might suffice. This course does, however, identify the complaining party to at least one element
of the executive. Another option is disclosure to Congress, although it is less likely to prompt
action if the president's party has a working majority, especially in the relevant committee.
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it is silent. Can we account for a system in which courts wield
constitutional law to protect the executive from disclosures demanded by
citizens and authorized by Congress-but that leaves public access claims
without constitutional backing, except when judicial proceedings are at issue?
It is highly unlikely that narrowly conventional sources of constitutional
meaning require this arrangement. The text of the Constitution certainly
does not track the distinctions we find in precedent. In fact, it provides
little guidance. Consider first the document's references to ,disclosure. The
president must provide "Information of the State of the Union," but only
"from time to time," and the addressee is Congress.' The text also signals a
governmental commitment to inform the public about taxes and spending.
Article I declares that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published"-but again, "from
time to time.' ' 82 The Sixth Amendment guarantees "the accused" the right
to a public trial;'83 and few will object if we read "due process of law"'" to
require some effort to notify a private party before the government takes
that party's liberty or property. 8 These requirements aside, the information
demands of other citizens or voters could be distinguished and rejected.'
But sometimes they are not. The Supreme Court has mandated public
access to criminal judicial proceedings, and lower courts have extended that
analysis to other forms of adjudication-without even restricting those
claims to "the press." Constitutional text is not driving these access rights.
Openness is not the only idea sparingly addressed by the constitutional
text. The Constitution mentions secrecy only once. Article I obligates the
181.
U.S. CONST. art. 1I,§ 3. In The Federalist No. 77, Hamilton refers to this activity as a
"power" of the president, while portraying the executive's prerogatives as modest. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 77, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "Duty" sounds
more like it. All further citations to The Federalistare to the Clinton Rossiter edition.
182.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)
(denying taxpayer standing to assert this clause against secrecy in CIA appropriations and
expenditures); see also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 152-54 (D.C. Cit. 1980) (denying that
FOIA solves the standing problem). But cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (granting a group
of voters standing under federal election law to demand access from the FEC to information about
a competing interest group); infra Part III.B.
183.
See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979).
184.
U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
185.
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (involving
notice to class members in damages class actions); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 445 (1982)
(involving notice of eviction actions to public housing tenants); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (involving the state's duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the criminally
accused). I leave aside the validity of gaps between primary conduct rules for private parties and
decision rules for government officials. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 53.
186.
Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317, 320 (1950)
(addressing notice by publication as a substitute for individualized notice, not as a public right).
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House and Senate to keep journals of their proceedings and to publish them
"from time to time... excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require Secrecy."'8 A subsequent provision might require journal publication of the names of those voting for and against a veto override." The
portions of congressional journals kept secret otherwise seem to be within
legislative discretion. A formalist conceivably could infer that the federal
government lacks discretion to withhold information about its operations
beyond such explicit authority. The First Amendment could support that
negative inference. It is the textual basis for opening certain judicial proceedings, but its words do not distinguish among components of the state. s9
And yet contemporary law does not work this way either. The president, for
example, enjoys some authority to withhold information as a matter of
executive privilege. Likewise, FOIA and FACA have been judicially
adjusted (or contorted) to serve executive interests, without an explicit constitutional command.
Arguments from history or tradition better reflect contemporary doctrine. They were, after all, some of the reasons given for mandating open
trials---a practice older than the Constitution. Furthermore, current federal constitutional law does not include justiciable public access claims for
congressional proceedings.' 9' Here, too, early founding-era history seems
consistent with contemporary law. The Senate met in closed session for its
first several years of operation.' 92 Indeed, the Constitutional Convention
was closed to the public.'9 And Publius recognized the value of secrecy

187.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl.
3; see also id. (providing for recording of the yeas and nays

upon a one-fifth vote); 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 290, 292-93,300-01.

188.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that the names "shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively"). This clause does not explicitly prohibit a majority vote in
Congress to keep those parts of the journals secret under Article I, Section 5. But that authority
would make it easier for members of Congress to remain anonymous than the text of Article I,
Section 7, seems to contemplate. Accord Vermeule, supra note 43, at 414 n.171 (addressing votes
to keep secret journal entries on roll call votes).
189.
The Amendment does single out "Congress" as the institution prohibited from making
laws abridging the freedom of speech and press. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. This makes limitation of
rights of public access to judicial proceedings even more difficult to explain with constitutional text.
190.
See supra Part II.A.2.b.
191.
Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (denying taxpayer standing to
assert the Accounts Clause of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7).
192.
See Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the
Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 281 & n.229 (2003).
193.
See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 134-39 (1928).
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to the effective conduct of diplomacy by the executive.'94 These facts
could yield public access to judicial proceedings and nothing else. 9 '
But several arguments counsel against ending the discussion here.
First is the point that courts have not confined their reasoning to historical
analysis. Executive privilege was recognized as a matter of constitutional

structure, and access to judicial proceedings was triggered by a combination
of tradition and good policy in light of institutional function. A second
objection covers those who ignore history in constitutional interpretation.
That group might be small, but certainly there are several other sources
with which to construct constitutional law in this area.
More important, the history that we do have can be used for a lot or a
little. We could restrict the significance of the historical record to only
conservative inferences. The closure of the Constitutional Convention
might be dismissed as the stand-alone choice of a deliberative body that
produced a proposal for public consideration, not a model for practices
under the proposed government. Pockets of secrecy for deliberation, diplomacy, and foreign affairs could be constitutionally guarded without extending
the protection to every activity in the executive and legislative branches.
Conversely, public access to judicial proceedings need not be immunized from
arguments for closure based on contemporary needs. Finally, two developments
since the founding should be considered. The Senate opened to the public in
1795,196 and openness-in-government efforts have been an important part of
our tradition since then. Moreover, the founding generation did not confront a
large federal bureaucracy built for modem society. Our post-New Deal
194.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392-93 (John Jay) (discussing the president's power to

negotiate treaties); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against a House role in treaty ratification: "Accurate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same
views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are
incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and so numerous.").
Cf. O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 45 (contending that the history of the First Amendment
195.
indicates not access rights, but rather a fight over more rudimentary rights to publish); Martin D.
Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public
Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 51 (2002) (reviewing events surrounding Jay's
Treaty and the XYZ affair). But cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 110 (1985)
(quoting a passage from Cato's Letters developing a trustee conception of government officials, who
should want their deeds publicly examined); Dyk, supra note 11, at 959 (quoting James Madison,
Report of the Committee to Whom Were Referred the Communications of Various States, Relative to the
Resolutions of the Last General Assembly of this State, Concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws (Va.
House of Delegates, 1799-1800)).
196.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). A pre-1795 exception was
made for a Senate election contest. See id.
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federal government has a scope and character unforeseen by those involved
in eighteenth-century constitution making.
Significant accountability
concerns not faced by the founders are raised by the new government.
If neither text nor history explains current law, the debate might turn to
inferences from constitutional structure. We have already sketched the terms
of that discussion."' But the conclusion is painfully opaque. Plausible
inferences point in more than one direction. Executive efficacy demands
confidentiality for certain circumstances, and that same immunity from
public scrutiny generates conflict with democratic premises. The same might
be said of judicial operations.9 It takes little imagination to see information
access and executive secrecy as necessary components of the federal
government. It takes much more to reconcile them.
Finally, a popular argument against public access claims should be noted
and rejected. Some commentators find it helpful to characterize the U.S.
Constitution as guaranteeing "negative" as opposed to "positive" or
"affirmative" rights. The second category, which involves lawsuits demanding
that the state take action for the benefit of a complaining citizen, is assertedly
left to political discretion. In fact, this bifurcation of rights claims worked its
way into the public access field at a fairly early stage."9 And it is not a bad way
of describing many constitutional case outcomes, °° particularly those in which
citizens have asked federal courts to establish social welfare rights.'2 01
But the positive/negative rights distinction is more distracting than
helpful for present purposes. Most broadly, it just seems wrong to say that
liberal democracy entails no affirmative constitutional obligations on the part
of government officials. If nothing else, they surely have a duty to facilitate
elections. Providing information about government operations might not
be far off. But even if all judicially enforceable constitutional law must involve
"negative rights," many public access claims fit that category. Secrecy takes
effort." 2 Among other measures, access to information is restricted by closing
doors, soundproofing committee rooms, adding electronic firewalls, and firing
197.

See supra Parts I, II.A.1 & II.A.2.b.

198.
However, the purposeful lack of electoral accountability in federal courts might weaken the
defense of the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. For an argument nevertheless favoring presumptive
access to adjudicative proceedings in the federal executive, see Kitrosser, supra note 11, at 100.
199.
See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 9, at 145-46; see also Lillian R. BeVier, The First
Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280, 1285
(2005) ("[The [First] Amendment is a shield, not a sword.").
200.
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
201.
See infra note 267.
202.
Cf. STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTU.URE AT M.I.T. 202 (1988)
("Information wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distribute, copy, and recombine--too
cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipient.").
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loose-lipped employees. The positive/negative line will not help us make
intelligent decisions about justiciable public access claims. Now, it might be
that the distinction is actually driven by a lack of confidence in the judiciary.
One might oppose the judicial definition and enforcement of certain types of
constitutional values, especially when they impose serious costs on other
institutions. This objection is undeniably powerful, but it should start an
3 rather than end the
argument about institutional choice and design
discussion with a crude generalization of U.S. constitutional law.
C.

Institutional Competence

There are no simple answers for the panoply of substantive access
issues-when access demands are legitimate and substantial, when they are
overridden by individual privacy concerns or law enforcement needs, and so
on. There is another angle from which to approach the matter, however. It
shifts attention from particularized disputes to questions about who should
resolve them."°a We might not know exactly how to solve a given access dispute, but it might be easier to figure out how best to allocate authority 2for
05
matter here, too.
deciding access issues. Ideas about constitutional structure
Courts themselves have used questions about institutional competence
to foreclose some access claims. The plurality opinion in Houchins is a good
start. Chief Justice Burger's basic message was that the rules for access to
government information should be a policy question for the political process
206
rather than a matter of judicial intervention. We can break out two general
reasons for this allocation of responsibility away from the federal judiciary.

203.

See infra Parts II.C., Ill.

204.

See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN

LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208 (1988) ("[The courts must be authorized-indeed, required-to
consider their own, and the other branches', limitations and propensities when they construct
doctrine to govern future cases."); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003).
Notions of constitutional structure are used for a different purpose in this section. In the
205.
last section, structure provided little help in resolving substantive access disputes-that is, whether a
given part of the government should be open or closed as a matter of constitutional law. Here,
structure is relevant to comparative institutional capacities, which help us choose an institutional
arrangement for addressing substantive access disputes. A constitution might be vague about
substantive outcomes yet more instructive about where disputes should be resolved.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[Respondents'
206.
argument] invites the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative task which the
Constitution has left to the political processes."); see id. at 12-16. Similarity to the political
questions doctrine is obvious.
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First, there is skepticism about the courts' own competence. There are
no obvious constitutional rules for adjudicating public access claims, and
the judiciary has reservations about generating these rules. Part of the concern involves transition costs. As the plurality put it in Houchins, "Because
the Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory standards, hundreds
of judges would... be at large to fashion ad hoc standards, in individual
cases, according to their own ideas of what seems 'desirable' or 'expedient.""'2 7
Another part of the incompetence argument is doubt that courts will be able
to see and accommodate all significant interests at stake in access claims.
Many legitimate interests must be reconciled to build an acceptable system of
public access. The most obvious candidates are national defense, law
enforcement, personal privacy, trade secrets, and candid deliberation within
the executive branch. But there might be more. Even if these interests are
recognized by courts, it could take considerable time and effort before they
produce something more than ad hoc results. It is thus reasonable to
conclude that courts should be disqualified from the job of system design."
Finally, in certain classes of cases, courts might be incompetent to adjudicate
even if they have a good test to use. That is the theme of FOIA Exemption 1
cases, which involve national security."
Second, information about government operations might be obtained
by alternative means. The plurality stressed this point in Houchins, where
the available alternatives included legislation, oversight and investigation
by other officials, judicial inquiry during criminal proceedings, media or
public pressure on politicians for disclosure, and access to human sources
other than the inmate population."' A similar set of alternatives is often
available for federal executive operations. Information might become public
207.
Id. at 14; see also id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring); BICKEL, supra note 9, at 87 ("The First
Amendment offers us no formula describing the degree of freedom of information that is consistent
with necessary privacy of government decision-making."); BOLuNGER, supra note 9, at 146 (worrying
about "the massiveness of the enterprise"); BeVier, supra note 9, at 506-08.
208.
Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 19, at 105-07 (recognizing that "[glovernment can
compromise public deliberation at least as effectively through secrecy as through censorship," but
suggesting access as a judicially underenforced First Amendment norm and FOIA as a reasonable
response); Strauss, supra note 19, at 358-59 (arguing that access is underenforced by courts for
constitutional reasons and institutional concerns).
209.
See supra Part II.A.l.c. Judicial reticence might be simple shirking. Public access
claims are more work regardless of court competence. I have no good way of assessing this
problem, however. It is also conceivable that federal courts are lackeys for the executive, to which
they owe life tenure. This might be true at times, but the argument's strong form is inconsistent
with, for example, recent cases involving the war on terrorism. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
210.
See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12-13 & n.7 (plurality opinion) (citing FOIA); see also id. at 16
& n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).
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from internal investigations by the executive itself, leaks and whistleblowers, congressional oversight,"' and individualized due process rights to
notice. Similar arguments can be made insofar as the concern is too much
disclosure. If identified, employees making unauthorized disclosures risk
professional, personal, and reputational injury. The executive does not
need judicial approval before taking these actions.
These two reasons-judicial incompetence and access alternatives-are
persuasive in certain respects and incomplete in others. Surely courts are
unsuitable arbiters when both of these considerations point in the same direction. It thus makes practical sense to restrict judicial authority when
constitutional text provides little substantive guidance, court competence is
otherwise in question, and reliable alternative methods of dispute resolution
are available. A freestanding constitutional claim to information about
lawfully authorized military or intelligence operations, for example, is fanciful. But public access to judicial proceedings is qualitatively different.
Courts are rightly comfortable managing their own operations (and probably
uncomfortable recognizing informal methods of extracting information
about their business). Putting aside objections to the U.S. Supreme Court
managing access to state judiciaries, it is not shocking that federal courts
have generated constitutional tests for judging court closure. Neither FOIA
nor any other federal access legislation covers the judiciary; the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases"' can be seen as an effort by the courts to selfregulate public access without the kind, of congressional interference
suffered by the executive.
Not every judicial move is as easily explained, however. How can institutional competence concerns underwrite the Supreme Court's recognition of
executive privilege as constitutional law? Denying the privilege in Nixon fits
with an account of courts striving to preserve their own prerogatives. Yet the
underlying endorsement of executive privilege could interfere with
congressional demands for executive information, and in any case displays a
confidence in designing access rules that is lacking in other areas. Why
would a court feel competent to fashion an executive privilege--or perhaps
a set of overlapping privileges'-but incompetent to articulate the elements of
a public access claim to executive-held documents? Was there good reason to
believe that presidents lack alternative defenses to improper congressional
Cf. Ferejohn, supra note 40, at 134 (indicating that legislatures have more leverage
211.
over executive agencies than voters have over elected officials, because of advantages in
organization, reward/punishment options, and information about government institutions).
See supra Part l.A.2.b.
212.
See supra text accompanying note 100.
213.
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(or judicial) demands? And if courts are built in a way that makes them
incompetent to judge access claims, can they constitutionally adjudicate
14
FOIA claims at all?
Perhaps the 1970s presented uncommon risks to the presidency and
called for action to prevent congressional supremacy. On that theory, the
federal judiciary might have been justified in promoting executive privilege
while confining legislation like FOIA and FACA. Opening courtrooms could
then be described as a defensive maneuver to forestall external regulation,
or an unimportant sideshow to the central struggle over executive power.
However persuasive this assessment is, the need for such judicial intervention changes over time. If the federal courts may legitimately attempt
to moderate power swings favoring Congress, the same is probably true
when power swings the other way. Even if there is a systematic difference
between threats to secrecy and threats to public accountability, along with
a good way to measure it-neither of which has been demonstrated-the
gap would still have to be substantial enough to warrant categorically different treatment of access and secrecy. And if instead the federal courts have
no business performing a checking function in this context, then it becomes
difficult to defend the executive privilege entrenched by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, considerations of institutional competence probably
explain, as well as any other factor, our constitutional law of information
access. Courts have relied on these ideas, and their reluctance to design
outright a system of access and secrecy is understandable." 5 Institutional
competence cannot account for every judicial decision, but it does have
some explanatory power.

II2.

PLATFORMS FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

The foregoing explains why access law makes sense in a democracy.
Some parts of the world use constitutional law and judicial review; some
parts of our domestic law follow suit. But it is hard to understand why one
piece of our law is judicially enforceable and constitutionally entrenched
214.
The objection would go beyond Exemption 1. For example, the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000), exempts
records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings .... (C) could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,... or
(F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
Id.
215.

See supra Part I.B.2 (canvassing foreign court decisions).
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while another might not be. Constitutional text is not the answer, and history is only a start. Moreover, defending our conventional constitutional
order becomes more challenging in light of courts' willingness to engage in
large-scale structural reasoning: Executive needs justified executive privilege, and democracy's needs helped justify courtroom openness. But these
sorts of justifications sweep across institutional boundaries, and so the
analysis turned to issues of institutional competence. Such practical considerations offered hope for rationalizing the patterns in U.S. law. In this
final section, however, I suggest that the hope is false. There is no practical
reason to deny constitutional status and judicial enforcement to public
access claims involving the executive-if we are prepared to weaken the
boundary between constitutional and other forms of law.
A. Competence Reexamined
There is something missing from the institutional competence account
described above. Part of that account turns on the absence of easily ascertainable standards for adjudicating public access claims. This gap in substance seemed obvious in Houchins, which dealt with a county jail. No brand
of federal law already spelled out the access rules for that situation. Yet federal
executive operations look different. Even if constitutional text is equally
ambiguous, there are legislative, administrative, and attendant judicial
standards for resolving this kind of dispute. FOIA, FACA, executive orders,
administrative regulations, and a growing pool of case law help adjust the
flow of information to the public, despite the preferences of individual
executive officials. Is this relevant to constitutional law and judicial review?
One answer is "obviously yes," but in a way already addressed by the
institutional competence account. Recall that the account broke into two
reasons for judicial retreat: incapacities within the courts plus alternatives
beyond them. The second reason is grounded in the existence of nonjudicial
or nonconstitutional mechanisms. These alternatives are cited to ease
worries about insufficient disclosure and thereby to undercut the need for
freestanding constitutional claims. Hence, the two component justifications
are complementary-judicial incapacity heightens the desire for alternative
methods of dispute resolution, and existing alternatives minimize the demand
for a more assertive judicial role. In this respect, it is crucial to understand
that statutes like FOIA provide standards for public access. But this adds
nothing interesting to the institutional competence account.
The better question is whether the two justifications for judicial passivity
can turn on each other-whether the alternatives somehow enhance court
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competence. And in a practical sense, they do. Some of the alternatives to
constitutional claims actually make constitutional intervention more feasible.
Consider first the understandable opposition to standardless judicial
action. If drawn on for constitutional purposes, 16 a nonconstitutional system
can reduce fears that hundreds of federal judges would create their own
personal lists of adequate reasons for secrecy. Among other sources, FOIA
provides a set of exemptions from the ordinary presumption of public access
to records.217 Courts could work from that set,21 adjusting how the statutory
and administrative components operate, or extending their application to
uncovered fields of executive action."' Working from existing nonconstitutional law not only reduces concerns about judicial ability to see all legitimate
competing interests, it also helps solve the problem of transition from
executive discretion to court-elaborated standards. Federal courts might be
unsuited to design a system of access and secrecy from scratch, but they do
not have to. Nonconstitutional law could provide a safe baseline.
Doubts about judicial expertise are also diminished by the current
nonconstitutional access system. It already enlists the federal courts.2
Federal judges now have substantial training in adjudicating executive access
disputes and in elaborating access rules promulgated by other institutions.
And those rules are by no means self-executing. The FOIA exemptions are
examples. Some of them require tricky, case-specific risk assessments;
others merely refer to generic categories of information that can be withheld
from public view.2 Experience in ordinary litigation makes it more difficult
to see the judiciary as a hapless incompetent. If the expertise objection
216.
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 84-86 (describing the Indian Supreme Court's
decision to borrow from executive proposals in order to effectuate a constitutional access norm).
217.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
218.
Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22 (1998) (distinguishing the statutory access claim at issue
from the treatment of the Accounts Clause claim in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 178
n.11 (1974) (dicta) (referring to "general directives" in the Constitution)); Kathleen A. Dockry,
Note, The First Amendment Right of Access to Government-held Information: A Re-Evaluation After
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 34 RUTGERs L.REV. 292, 343 (1982).
219.
See infra Part III.C.3 (presenting limits to FOIA as illustrative). Application of these
federal standards, modified or not, seems more dangerous with respect to state and local
operations. Those governments have their own access systems, and federal courts are less likely to
be familiar with them.
220.
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)-(G) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
221.
See, e.g., id. § 552(b)(7)(F) (2000) (exempting "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information ... could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of
any individual").
222.
See id. § 552(b)(6) (exempting "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
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persists, moreover, it seems equally applicable to ordinary access statutes.
Sustaining the objection therefore requires us to seriously question the
constitutionality of judicial involvement with the current system. The idea
that courts are constitutionally barred from any part of this decades-long role
seems both extravagant and without a serious proponent.
Finally, insofar as institutional competence arguments are based on
feasibility concerns, existing practice is at least a partial response. The
statutory and regulatory system confirms that public access claims are manageable, if hardly cost-free. Annually the executive branch receives about
three million FOIA and Privacy Act... requests. It spends approximately
$320 million responding, with something less than $10 million in litigation
2
costs for the 300 to 400 cases filed in court each year. These numbers are
significant, and they might increase with the judicial elaboration under
consideration," 5 but the costs are not staggering. Experience indicates that it
is feasible to open a wide scope of material to a virtually unlimited class of
potential requestors.
These contentions about judicial competence are not enough to
recommend judicial intervention. The practical ability to act is not sufficient
reason to do so, unless power is confused with legitimacy. That distinction
is where this project began. If the difference between ability and justification is important for restraining executive action in a democracy, it is just
as critical for evaluating judicial action. But equally apparent are the fundamental deficiencies in the institutional competence account. This explanation for our current practice offers up alternative access systems to confirm
that judicial intervention is unwarranted. And yet some of those systems
relieve judicial burdens. The existing nonconstitutional framework
provides a good start on substance, judicial training, and demonstrated feasibility. The remaining task, then, is to think more broadly about the

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a, (b), (d) (2000 & Supp. 2005) (permitting individuals to request certain
223.
records pertaining to them and held by agencies); see also id. § 552a(g) (2000) (providing for civil suits).
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL22FOIA
224.
REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2004foiapost .htm.
Even with the prospect of recovering attorney's fees, private party use of FOIA's litigation
opportunity is capped by the procedural costs of pressing on after agency denial. For one
indication of benefits-a sample of published news articles making use of FOIA requests-see the
National Security Archive, FOIA in the News: 38 Noteworthy Articles Made Possible by FOIA in
2003-2004, http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/foia/stories.htm. See also Sam Dillon & Diana Jean
Schemo, CharterSchools Fall Short in Public Schools Matchup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at A21; Eric
Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Opens Inquiry Into Abuse of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A20.
This would depend on several factors, of course, such as the degree to which entirely
225.
new claims become available as opposed to existing claims becoming more potent.
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connection between ordinary law and constitutional law, and the
relationship this connection fosters between courts and other institutions.
B.

Approaches to Systems

Building the case for modification of the current system depends on
unconventional thinking. Constitutional norms must work in conjunction
with subconstitutional systems. That this sort of solution has been overlooked indicates an open space in ordinary constitutional analysis. Thus, if
constitutional law should be at work in this field, a larger reevaluation of the
options for judicial intervention is in order. To get that effort started,
several conceivable judicial reactions to existing systems can be identified,
each subject to a different set of normative objections.
At the extremes, courts might attempt to destroy or entrench an existing
system. Either is likely to be controversial and practically difficult, but once
in a while the objective might be defended. On the destruction side, assisting
in the Thirteenth Amendment's goal of eradicating slavery could be a
defensible example. 6 Yet no one seems to contend that statutes like FOIA
and FACA are totally forbidden by the Constitution. Courts do, and should,
provide some freedom to legislate access. On the entrenchment side, there is
even less traction. The judiciary must be confident that the system in question
is mandated by the Constitution, that the existing version of the system must
be impervious to change, and that courts should make these assessments.
Rarely will all of this be true. The Constitution plainly contemplates a
' but
functioning "Congress of the United States,"227
no particular committee
structure is dictated by the language in Article I,228 and no court• could
defend
• 229
an injunction permanently freeze-framing the current organization.
Less invasive options are available. The judiciary might practice
abstinence, refusing to participate in a system even when called on to do
so.'
Consider the judicially declared boundaries of Article III. Federal
226.
But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting enforcement power to Congress).
227.
Id. art. I, § 1; see id. amend. XX, § 2 (requiring Congress to assemble at least once a year).
228.
Cf. id. art. I, § 5,cl.
2 (stating that "[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings").
229.
More modest versions of entrenchment are easier to understand. For example, courts
have indicated that longstanding methods or public places for communication should not be
obliterated by regulation. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI.L.REV. 46,95-99 (1987) (discussing tradition). In these
areas the judiciary is not locking in a regulatory regime, but locking down elements of a system.
230.
Abstinence might be temporary, allowing for experimentation or data collection before a final
judicial conclusion is reached. Cf. Vieth v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)
(awaiting "workable standards" for impermissibly partisan gerrymanders); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
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courts may avoid difficult issues by imposing requirements for litigant
to issue advisory opinions,2" and by outsourcing
standing,"' by refusing
233
'
"political questions." Abstinence resembles the institutional competence
account, but the fit is imperfect. The judiciary has not abstained from access
disputes. As detailed above, the courts occasionally generate constitutional
law in the field and regularly adjudicate statutory claims. There is nothing
inherently abstract, nonadversarial, or otherwise nonjudicial about information
demands and refusals; modem discovery disputes and FOIA cases prove that
much. Additionally, the personal injury requirement for Article III standing
isno longer a threat to "public interest"-oriented access claims, at least where
Congress provides authority. This was not always clear. Federal courts
traditionally have shied from nonphysical, nonmonetary injuries shared by
many people-grievances so generalized that overtly political institutions
might be better suited to respond.3 Today, however, FEC v. Akins...
establishes that Article III standing does not prevent adjudication of demands
for public disclosure. Information deprivation, backed by nothing more
concrete than the interest of a voter in understanding the political process,
is justiciable with Congress's blessing.236 FOIA claims are safe from Article
III assaults.237
306, 342 (2003) (finding, based on a particular understanding of the goal of the Equal Protection Clause,
that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time"). In the text, I refer to more permanent versions.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63, 573-74 (1992).
231.
See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (reprinting an opinion and
232.
letters by federal judges refusing to participate as courts in a veterans' benefits program); 15 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 111 n.1 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (describing the justices'
refusal to respond to legal questions posed by the president through his secretary of state).
233.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Impeachment is a leading example. See
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (refusing to interfere with certain Senate
procedures for the impeachment "trial" of a federal district judge).
is the function
See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576 ("Vindicating the public interest ...
234.
of Congress and the Chief Executive."); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1974)
(denying standing to claim that a statute permitting CIA expenditures to remain secret violated the
Accounts Clause); I TRIBE, supra note 100, § 3-14, at 387-92; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.REV. 881, 894-95 (1983).
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
235.
See id. at 24-25 (recognizing voter standing to challenge an FEC refusal to require an
236.
association to disclose information regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures); accord
Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that failure to obtain information
subject to disclosure under FACA is a distinct injury providing standing); see also Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 616-17 (1999) ("[A]t least in information cases,
the question of standing is for congressional rather than judicial resolution.").
237.
Whether constitutionally inspired claims are similarly sheltered could be another
matter. But the notion of judicial platforms, outlined below, is that courts' use of constitutional
law sometimes may work from, and only because of, a nonconstitutional system generated by others.
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Contrast judicial respect for a system. This option is less aggressive than
the first three-destruction, entrenchment, and abstinence-and it makes
sense for a range of situations in which constitutional norms are difficult to
find. On this course the judiciary simply defers to the judgment of other actors
regarding substance, institutional choice, and institutional design. Courts
thereby work to avoid undermining or embedding a system for which others are
responsible, but they remain free to participate in the system when it so
demands. Such respect might be undependable when the design includes
judicial action within it: A court's sense of propriety and practicality could well
overrn the designers' plans. Conceptually, however, judicial respect is a
discrete alternative. But federal courts have not made this choice in access
cases, either. Executive privilege and restraints on FOIA and FACA make it
impossible to believe that courts are merely enforcing results reached in the
political process, as do decisions regulating public access to courts under the
First Amendment. The judiciary is intervening in the access system, beyond
ordinary statutory interpretation. And it is using constitutional law to do it.
The last approach is modification. It is the most difficult to evaluate at
wholesale because it covers so much: restricting a system's scope, extending
its reach, or otherwise altering the manner in which it operates. In each
form, however, judicial activity is usually more like adjusting than redesigning. While less ambitious than destruction or entrenchment, judicial
modification is more active than abstinence or respect. Judicially imposed
restraints are probably the most recognizable type of system modification.
One was described above: the use of constitutional inferences to restrict
public access under FOIA and FACA.238 Another kind of modification is
illustrated by due process requirements. Federal courts will not invoke the
Constitution to mandate cash transfers to the poor, for example, but termination of payments may depend on the government's willingness to provide
recipients notice and an opportunity to be heard. "9
Other than additional process, overt judicial expansion of existing systems is
harder to identify. But it happens. Enforcing constitutional equality norms can
have this effect. Other institutions sometimes prefer to grant opportunities (to
vote, to receive public education, to speak on public property, for example) only
to a subset of the population on a constitutionally impermissible basis (religion,
race, or political ideology, for example). If courts forbid such lines, extension of

238.
239.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976).
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the opportunities can follow.24 In any event, the judiciary regularly modifies
nonjudicial systems for constitutional purposes. And there is no easily detectible
rule permitting courts to cut back on existing systems, but not to push onward.
C.

Platforms

Judicial elaboration from constitutionally optional platforms is a generative type of system modification. Courts would pay attention to nonconstitutional systems constructed elsewhere without taking current boundaries
" ' this involves courts building on the
as given. As in some foreign nations,24
work of other institutions, borrowing their ideas and using the mechanisms
they have constructed, to accomplish constitutional goals that the judiciary
could not have attempted otherwise. This is different from imposing equality
norms, which might direct legislators to choose "both x and y"or "neither x nor
y." The platform idea amounts to a declaration from courts to nonjudicial
actors: "Now that you have provided a system addressing x, we may invoke
the Constitution to alter the operations surrounding x, or to add y, or to
' It is neither free-form common lawmaking nor simple statutory
subtract z."242
construction. Can it be defended?
In considering this question, keep in mind the space occupied by judicial
platforms. If secrecy and public access are foreign to the Constitution, the
argument is over. The idea applies only to situations in which existing
constitutional norms, for practical reasons, cannot be judicially enforced until
nonjudicial actors move toward the constitutional goal. There are countless
systems operated without substantial judicial involvement; few think courts
ought consciously to alter them without constitutional cause. This point
distinguishes William Eskridge and John Ferejohn's "super-statutes," which
"seek[] to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state
' The judicial platforms concept shares the notion that fundamental
policy."243
240.
Extension need not follow. Sometimes government will be permitted to withdraw the
benefit altogether.
241.
See supra Part 1.B.2.
242.
The idea can work the other way around. Nonjudicial institutions might build from a
platform created by the judiciary. This is consistent with the virtues of cross-institutional borrowing.
243.
William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001)
(adding that such a statute must also "over time... 'stick' in the public culture such that... the superstatute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect on the law-including an effect
beyond the four corners of the statute"); see id. at 1275-76. Another version of the idea appears in
Peter M. Shane, Voting Rights and the "Statutory Constitution," 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1993, at 243, 244 & n.3, 269 (exploring statutes, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that "may lay
claim to expressing our fundamental law in a way that entitles them to be included within the range of
material relevant to constitutional interpretation"); id. at 252 (listing six conditions for such statutes).
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constitutional law need not be totally separate from other types of law, 2" but it
does not entail that legislation itself add to our list of fundamental norms.245
Platforms facilitate judicial implementation of norms drawn from the
Constitution by conventional interpretive method, and these norms are new
only in that sense. In this way, judicial platforms are more like Gerhard
Casper's "framework legislation"-which implements structural values already
in our Constitution 2 -but supplemented by some form of judicial review."'
1.

Forerunners

In a general sense, judicial platforms are actually ubiquitous. All federal
court action rests on a statutory foundation. Congress was not obligated to
create any lower federal courts; their jurisdiction requires an affirmative
statutory grant; and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to
statutory exceptions."' It is perfectly conventional to believe that Article III
tribunals wield constitutional law only when enabled by valid legislation.249
But once Congress designed the basic statutory platform on which federal
courts operate, it lost discretion to dictate outcomes on constitutional issues
properly before those courts.25 Judicial use of constitutional law both depends
on and enjoys some independence from political institutions.
244.
See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 243, at 1266.
245.
See id. at 1267-75 (distinguishing Bruce Ackerman's work on constitutional moments).
246.
"By providing for information, consultation, and the legal consequences in cases of
disagreement between the [president and Congress], such legislation provides greater specificity to
the notion of legal constraints and attempts to stabilize expectations about the ways in which
governmental power is exercised." Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the
Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 188 (1985), citing Gerhard Casper, Constitutional
Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 463,482 (1976); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WETHE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 107 & n.* (1991).

247.

Cf.

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING

POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 69-72 (1990) (relying on the framework legislation

idea and commending "balanced institutional participation" that includes courts).
248.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I1l, §§ 1, 2, cl. 2; Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,
233-34 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850).
249.
There is an old debate about the authority of Congress to strip federal jurisdiction,
especially for constitutional questions. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER &
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

348-491 (5th ed. 2003). But nobody seems to argue that federal courts could have materialized
without congressional action. Aside from providing salaries and facilities, who else could have
confirmed appointees?
250.

See,

e.g.,

MARTIN

H.

REDISH,

FEDERAL

JURISDICTION:

TENSIONS

IN

THE

ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 48-49 (2d ed. 1990) (reading United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128, 145-46 (1871), narrowly to limit Congress's authority to direct federal courts to
apply an independently unconstitutional rule); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953); see also
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (preserving final federal judgments).
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In addition, there is no doubt that nonjudicial branches operate in
constitutional territory shared with courts. Think about constitutional
remedies. The text of the U.S. Constitution rarely describes the mechanisms
for its enforcement, 25' and so courts might generate a scheme of remedies in
the absence of applicable statutes or administrative regulations. 2 And yet
federal courts sometimes accept congressional or executive alternatives.
Modem courts are especially reluctant to authorize damages remedies when
another branch of government has spoken to the question.2 3 At the same
time, federal courts have not retreated unconditionally. Even with respect to
complex administrative dispute resolution systems, and ignoring equitable relief,
the Supreme Court tests these systems for constitutional adequacy.254 One way to
understand these cases is to distinguish complete relief for individual claimants
(which is only sometimes judicially mandated) from "a general structure of
constitutional remedies adequate to keep government within the bounds of
law., 25 In this sense, the constitutional remedies cases are at least compatible
with platforms for judicial elaboration. Although courts are not always assertive
here, multiple entities are working on the same constitutional problems.
With effort, tighter analogs can be found. Three touch on democratic
structure: disclosure requirements for informal federal rulemaking, state court
improvisations on election law, and federal court interest in developing a qualified journalist source privilege. In these examples, courts are driven by a
sense of constitutional value, but their ability to act alone is plainly restricted.
In the rulemaking context, the Supreme Court long has held that due
process does not require a particular form of public participation. 6 Lower
courts were apparently unsatisfied, however. They began generating public
participation requirements for informal federal agency rulemaking, beyond
251.
A partial exception is the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
252.
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (addressing damages claims); id. at 400, 404-06 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(stressing the traditional presumption that equitable relief is available in cases of constitutional
violation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,654-55 (1961) (addressing the exclusionary rule).
253.
See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to require awards of
consequential damages for the improper denial of cash benefits); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)
(addressing government employee claims for monetary relief beyond that authorized in ordinary law).
254.
See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14 (concluding that the nonjudicial scheme was "clearly
constitutionally adequate"); see also Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425 (concluding that Congress did not
fail to provide "meaningful safeguards or remedies").
255.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991).
256.
See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
("Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one
should have a direct voice in its adoption."); accord Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight,
465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (claiming that courts could not define and enforce such a right).
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what could be found in the Administrative Procedure Act.257 Although these
efforts were largely stymied by the Supreme Court,2 federal courts continue
to tack procedural requirements onto informal rulemaking. Courts do seem
chastened, however, and wisely so. Maximizing formal participation rights
often escalates decision costs without clearly producing offsetting benefits.
Information access requirements, in contrast, seem softer. Disclosure can be
inclusive without the cost and disruption of public rights to cross-examine
experts or enter evidence into the agency record. Accordingly, courts will
sometimes demand that agencies disclose data underlying their rulemaking
decisions."' This disclosure preference is not easy to see in statutory text, but it
does comport with some versions of due process and central components of
democratic accountability. In this situation, a proper reading of the Constitution
might not require public participation, but the procedures for rulemaking still
trigger information disclosure obligations as a judicially mandated supplement.
Another model comes from state election law. No one argues that state
courts should fabricate an entire election code governing ballot access,
districting, counts and recounts, election contests, and so on. And yet these
exercises make up a core feature of democracy. State legislatures are doing
constitutional work with election statutes, and such legislation marks the
regulatory starting line but is not always the final word on election disputes.
Thus, state courts sometimes explicitly recognize that the legislature isoperating
within the area of constitutional values and, at least partly for that reason,
become assertive in adjudicating election law cases.2" Courts are aptly situated
257.
See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 685-705 (5th ed. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 64-65 (1985) (attributing the judicial innovations
to a form of statutory interpretation or common law, rather than constitutional law).
258.
See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978) ("But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare."); id. at 542-43 & n.16. See
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.2 (2d ed.
2001) (emphasizing the problem of agency decision costs).
259.
See, e.g., Nat'l Black Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1023 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing
nondisclosure as one reason for remand to the agency); 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 434-38, 496-97 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing adequate public notice of rulemaking and

agency explanation); see also Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d 473, 499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1991). An
important but pre-Vermont Yankee case is Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate
rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, [in] critical degree, isknown only to the agency.").
260.
See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236-38
(Fla. 2000) (imposing a relaxed deadline for certain recounts in light of a state constitutional right to
vote), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000), on remand,
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Some state courts have
declared that their election statutes must be construed liberally to enfranchise voters. See, e.g., In re
Gray-Sadler, 753 A.2d 1101, 1105 (N.J. 2000) (referring to constitutional law and statutory
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to tweak statutory and administrative systems as a way of promoting given
constitutional norms, without appropriating the system outright. This is not
an unwavering pattern, and the idea surely was controversial even before Bush
v. Gore.26' Nevertheless, judicial elaboration from election statutes survives.262
Judicial experience with a journalist source privilege is a final example.
Despite Branzburg v. Hayes, many lower federal courts recognize a qualified
privilege for reporters who object to disclosing the identity of their sources.263
Although it is not always clear whether and why this privilege is based on the
First Amendment rather than on federal common law, a few courts have
taken into account federal guidelines on prosecutorial demands for information
from the news media. 4 In general, these guidelines require consideration of
need and alternative sources, negotiation, and permission from the Attorney
General before compulsory process is used against journalists in either civil or
objectives of enfranchisement, deterring fraud, and protecting ballot secrecy); Appeal of James, 105
A.2d 64, 66 (Pa. 1954). Sometimes the canon is codified. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103 (2000).
531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (contending that the Florida
261.
state courts had departed from the state statutory scheme sufficiently to violate Article II).
See, e.g., Gaddis v. McCullough, 827 N.E.2d 66, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("We should
262.
at all times have before us the fundamental principle that no voter should be deprived of his
franchise for the infringement of any technical requirements in casting his ballot." (quoting
Dobbyn v. Rogers, 76 N.E.2d 570, 582 (Ind. 1948))); Tillis v. Wright, 619 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 2005)
(addressing ballot access for party-nominated candidates); cf. Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d
724, 727 (Minn. 2003) (involving access to absentee ballots).
See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases, though
263.
denying protection on the facts); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986)
(civil context); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cit. 1983) (involving a subpoena from
a criminal defendant); see also Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999)
(setting out a test for protecting nonconfidential information, though leaving a First Amendment
basis for the privilege unclear). But cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964,
968-73 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying a First Amendment privilege and holding that any common
law privilege was qualified and overcome in this case, involving a grand jury investigation into the

leak of a CIA operative's identity), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).
See In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 370-71 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (noting the court's con264.
sideration and the prosecution's alleged violation of 28 C.F.R. § 50.10), affd en banc, 963 F.2d 567
(3d Cit. 1992); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 296-97 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (indicating
that the guideline "must" be followed by the United States, in addition to the similar demands of
a court-articulated qualified privilege); Maurice v. NLRB, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2221, 2224
(S.D. W. Va. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 691 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982); Adam Liptak, The

Hidden Federal Shield Law: On the Justice Department'sRegulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press,
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 232-33; see also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781-82 (2d Cir.
1972) (indicating post-Branzburg approval of the district court's reference to state shield statutes
to inform federal policy). A prior version of the regulation was used in Branzburg as a reason to
deny a reporter's privilege under the First Amendment. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
707 (1972) ("These rules ... may prove wholly sufficient to resolve the bulk of disagreements and
controversies between press and federal officials."). For contentions that the regulation is too
weak in the hands of executive officials, and may be underinclusive in its application to the
category of "journalists," see Jennifer Elrod, Protecting Journalists From Compelled Disclosure: A

Proposalfor a Federal Statute, 7 N.Y.U. J.LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 154-58 (2003).
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criminal proceedings."' Borrowing from that process and those standards can
help ensure that court-preferred rules are at least feasible. The guidelines
were not written for judicial enforcement, of course.2" But we are not
automatically beyond the realm of constitutional law just because a
nonjudicial actor creates a rule of decision that is compatible with judicial
opinion. Originality is not a requirement for sound doctrine. Concluding
otherwise indefensibly equates courts with constitutional law, while depriving
the former of useful sources for practical implementation of the latter.
2.

Warnings

While it is wrong to insulate constitutional law from other law, we do
need a standard that distinguishes acceptable elaboration from dangerous
flights of fancy. Courts often (and thankfully) refuse to superimpose constitutional law on existing systems. In the federal courts, social welfare cases are
poignant examples. 267 The problem is not simply an ethereal conception of
legitimate court action. Ill-advised judicial intervention can do real world
damage. And because platforms are solutions to practical limits on judicial
action, a range of pragmatic concerns deserves attention.
First is the persistent risk of unintended consequences. Complex systems theorists warn that, for certain types of systems, even discrete interventions can have nonlinear effects.268 If courts are incompetent to design
the relevant system outright, there is reason to doubt their ability to skillfully
tinker with it. 69 Part of the worry is the feasibility of modifications. Another
part might be fiscal.
Second, plausible nonjudicial responses should be assessed. The
modifications under consideration, at least in the first instance, are beyond
the control of Congress and the executive. If these institutions are aware
265.

28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004).

266.
See id. § 50.10(n) (denying intent to create or recognize legally enforceable rights); In re
Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1992) (alternative holding); In re Special Counsel
Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32 (D.D.C. 2004) (same). Justice Department employees may
be administratively sanctioned for violations, however.
267.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-44 (1973) (refusing to
interfere with public school financing systems to try to equalize educational opportunity); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (declining to recognize a constitutional guarantee of adequate
housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (upholding caps on welfare
payments to families); infra text accompanying notes 295-296.
268.
See, e.g., AUYANG, supra note 10, at 234 (describing nonlinearity); Charles J. Kibert,
Green Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 491, 494 (2004) (discussing
climate); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A WakeUp Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 854 (1996).
269.
Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 11 (stressing that courts are complex system participants).
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that a system can become a platform for court creativity, they might not
construct it in the first place. Net-positive systems might never be initiated--or might be abolished once judicial modification becomes apparent.
Third, reliance on judicial modification can turn into an unhealthy
dependence on the courts. In the long run, it is almost by definition better
that democracies solve most public problems through nonadjudicatory politics. Recurrent court fixes for errant systems, even if successful within each
system, might end up damaging democracy. Such rescues could lower the
stakes of ordinary politics, thereby dampening any existing commitment to
careful design by politicians and civil servants.
Finally, courts should look for a demonstrated need. This follows from
the dangers identified. Taking these risks seriously entails the ability to target
a significant achievement that could result from judicial intervention. At the
same time, willingness to endorse departures from existing systems should be
a function of the mission's importance. A less dispensable objective will
increase tolerance for experimentation, if the goal is otherwise in jeopardy.
Each of these considerations suggests that platforms ought to be used
with caution-not only as to the form of judicial modification, but also in
selecting occasions for any improvisation at all.
3.

Translucent Government

The discussion above amounts to an analytical structure for evaluating
the usefulness of judicial platforms. It can be outlined in four points. First,
a constitutional value must be at stake. If it is, the issue is how best to implement that value. Second, a practical problem must undercut the ability of
courts to elaborate or enforce the constitutional norm. Otherwise, courts
might simply exercise independent judgment. Third, an existing system must
help solve the hindrance to judicial participation. If there is no such platform, nothing will be gained by pointing to intervention by others. And
fourth, the possible dangers of judicial action must be considered.
Unintended adverse consequences, backlash or other problematic nonjudicial
response, and an unbalanced reliance on litigation over ordinary politics
should be accounted for and compared to the need for action and the
significance of the objective. These four inquiries might be used in a number
of fields-from voting rights, to campaign finance, to welfare reform-where
they could produce quite different conclusions. For present purposes, the question is public access to information about the executive. Much of the case for
using platforms in that context has now been made.
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For both executive secrecy and public access, which are points along a
single axis, constitutional status turns on structural logic. Every democracy
develops a system for distributing and withholding information about
government operations. Popular accountability depends on information
access, while effective and sensible action requires secrecy on occasion.7 In
addition, information about government facilitates a central function of the
First Amendment: public discussion of political issues. And a law of access
provides guidelines rather than relying on individualized official discretion.
These ideas are reflected in the constitutional text and practices of many
new democracies,17 1 and they are embedded in our own governmental order.
U.S. courts already understand this. They have invoked structural and
democratic arguments to justify restrictions on access statutes, along with
openness in judicial proceedings.272
A contrary conclusion-that, at least in general, our Constitution has
nothing to do with secrecy or access-might be possible. If that is correct,
however, executive privilege and any other implied constitutional protection
for government secrecy would be on the chopping block. It is also
conceivable that executive discretion to withhold information is more critical
to executive operations than public disclosure is to democratic governance.
But this is a very ambitious claim with contestable normative and descriptive
aspects. 273 In any event, the contemporary dispute is more about the
propriety of judicial intervention than the fundamental or constitutional
character of the values in controversy.7
Platforms fit this dispute. Critics on and off the bench assert that
courts are incompetent to grapple with the delicate issues of information
access. Setting aside the legitimacy of executive privilege, judicial design of
an access system does seem difficult at best. A foundation already exists,
however. As detailed above,275 statutes and regulations can be used as a
baseline for substantive judgment, they already have been the basis for judicial training in the field, and they indicate that widespread public access
rights are feasible and valuable. Of course, borrowing from nonjudicial
sources to construct constitutional law departs from some traditional

270.
271.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.B.

272.

See supra Part II.A.

273.
274.
275.

See supra notes 213-214 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part 1I.A.
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thinking. But the integration of constitutional and nonconstitutional law
276
can be powerfully useful and is not entirely new, even if it is largely unheralded.
Because judicial intervention might produce undesirable consequences, however, access advocates should identify a substantial need for
reform."' This is a challenging task, foremost because information outsiders
have no good way of measuring what is being withheld. Moreover, the
optimal substantive standards for access are not a matter of consensus. On
the other hand, waiting for a (possibly fanciful) global measure of adequate
access is a mistake. Instead we should begin with a sensible skepticism
7
about the government's use of information, ' and then look for particular
deficiencies in the formal system for resolving access disputes. Although my
purpose is not to detail every shortcoming in the existing system, attention to
a few specifics is useful and consistent with a lower-level focus that courts
should be using. Working from a nonjudicial platform forecloses full-scale
restructuring by the courts.
The least likely candidate for greater access, in my view, is executive
deliberation. In its simple form, deliberation formulates a course of action
without executing it. Permitting the executive, like Congress and the
courts, to choose who participates has obvious value and little immediate
threat to the public at large. Certainly there are risks of untoward behavior
here. But for all the complaints about the shallow secrecy surrounding the
energy and healthcare policy task forces, the executive gained openness
within the deliberations, which resulted in proposals subject to public critique
and prolonged debate.279
Access to other sorts of information is another matter. Using FOIA as
an example, four weaknesses stand out. First, the statute is mistitled. It is not
a freedom of "information" law. It only reaches agency "records." The
definition thereof is subject to interpretation, but it most clearly refers to
8
surviving artifacts of past communication. Thus the statute is not a tool for
See supra Part III.C.1.
276.
See supra Part III.C.2.
277.
See supra Part I.A. Concerns should probably be heightened when opposition parties
278.
lack important tools for executive oversight, such as congressional subpoenas. One-party
government can be more productive, but it also weakens nonjudicial mechanisms of disclosure.
See Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
279.
(discussing the deliberations of the Task Force on National Health Care Reform and its mission to
present a proposal to the president, which later failed in Congress); NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEV.
GROUP,

NATIONAL

ENERGY

POLICY

3-8

to

3-9

(2001),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/

energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf (discussing oil drilling in Alaska, and displaying a photograph
of what appear to be caribou grazing in front of a power plant).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975) (indicating
280.
that FOIA does not obligate agencies to create records).
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obtaining explanations from government officials, or for receiving aggregate
data as yet unassembled, no matter how publicly important the issue.r
Second, these records must be in the possession of the executive. Individuals
can move records beyond FOIA's reach by removing them to a privately
controlled location2 2-- or by destroying them. Such conduct might well
violate the Federal Records Act,28 3 but that legislation lacks a private right of

action."8 Third, parts of the executive are categorically off-limits to FOIA
requests. The White House staff is a prominent exclusion,
and the executive's advantage in Exemption 1 cases is stifling. Finally, even if FOIA and its

judicial implementation hit the appropriate degree of public access, the
system is subject to rollback. The most recent directive from the Attorney
General is to be more careful about disclosure;286 and in Fiscal Year 2003, the

Justice Department invoked about 140 statutes as specific authority to
withhold records under FOIA's Exemption 3.287
protection, that number has no ceiling.

Absent constitutional

281.
Cf. Judith Resnick, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 797-98 (2004)
(explaining that researchers must collect data about administrative adjudication agency by agency).
282.
See Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 154-55 (1980);
United We Stand Am., Inc. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that "agency
records" must be created or obtained by an agency, as well as in the agency's control); see also
Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1989) (distinguishing personal items of
government employees); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1995)
(explaining that staff notes "ordinarily need not be disclosed unless they are intended for distribution
through normal agency channels or can be said to be within the 'control or dominion' of an agency"
(quoting Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2782 v. Dep't of Commerce, 652 F. Supp. 1272, 1277
(D.D.C. 1986))).
283.
44 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3107, 3301-3314 (2000); see also id. §§ 2201-2207 (Presidential
Records Act).
284.
See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 148 (regarding improper removal of records). But cf. Am.
Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 40-42 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (attempting to distinguish
Kissinger, and permitting Administrative Procedure Act review to prevent destruction
of
documents by agencies charged with enforcing the records retention statutes).
285.
The statute specifies the "Executive Office of the President," 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (2000),
but was apparently not intended to reach "the President's immediate personal staff or units in the
Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President." H.R. REP. No. 93-1380,
at 15 (1974); see Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156 (endorsing this limitation); Armstrong v. Executive
Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 557-59 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the National Security
Council is not an "agency" subject to FOIA, and listing other like entities).
286.
See Memorandum of Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding the Freedom of
Information Act (Oct. 15, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2001foiapostl9.htm ("When
you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can
be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound
legal basis....").
287.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (stating that "[tihis section does not apply to matters that
are ... specifically exempted from disclosure by statute" if the statute leaves no discretion to
disclose or "establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to
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These limitations justify judicial action, given the right cases and conditions. Removing documents from the executive does not necessarily
remove knowledge of wrongdoing or controversial action. At some point
public accountability will dictate the inconvenience of officials explaining
their actions rather than simply disclosing remnants of an official record.
Similar problems follow from exempting parts of the executive from public
access regulation. The statutes and court-made constitutional law already
protect most high-level deliberation and national security-related information. A flat prohibition on all formal information requests does save the work
of articulating reasons for nondisclosure. But the articulation itself is a useful
exercise, and the difference between zero access under current law and partial
access under FOIA and its exemptions does not seem devastating. This is
particularly true when congressional oversight is slack. Perhaps equally
important are lower-level operations and the proliferation of statutory
exceptions. Judicial recognition of a constitutional access norm can halt
unjustified retrogression of statutory access rights. Finally, courts themselves
bear responsibility for neutering FOIA in the Exemption 1 context. This
overcommitment is present in the 9/11 detainee records case, in which judicial
scrutiny was essentially absent.2" Often judicial deference is appropriate. But
the operation of Exemption 1 has crossed into a constitutional danger zone,
especially considering widespread agreement that the executive classifies too
much information in the first place.289 No nonjudicial institution seems
prepared to correct or to minimize these problems substantially.
As for the dangers identified above-unintended consequences, effects
29
on nonjudicial actors, and an undue dependence on courts -they seem
manageable in this context. Some measure of unforeseen effects of intervention is probably unavoidable. Complex systems theory should not,
be withheld"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 224 (quantifying agency use of Exemption 3).
Exemption 3 statutes are scattered throughout the U.S. Code. A regularly used provision is 41
U.S.C. § 253b(m) (2000) (prohibiting release of certain proposals for government contracts). A troubling
provision is part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 107(a)(2) (prohibiting
release of conflict of interest disclosure statements from certain part-time and temporary
government employees, where an administrative regulation requires these statements). See
Meyerhoff v. EPA, 958 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1992) (unanimously concluding that conflict of
interest disclosures required of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) science advisors could be
withheld, but splintering over the grounds).
See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920, 931-32 (D.C. Cir.
288.
2003) (relying on a law enforcement exemption and relatively conclusory paper declarations from
executive officials), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004
Sup. CT. REV. 47, 61-62 (describing the decision as an instance of "National Security
Maximalism").
See supranote 139.
289.
See supra Part III.C.2.
290.
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however, be converted into automatic opposition to judicial intervention-a
conclusion that would counsel repudiation of executive privilege as much as
judicially crafted extensions of access claims. Given court experience with
the existing access system, and confining judicial intervention to modest
attempts at reform, significant injury to the system can be prevented.
The deterrence problem might be defused in two ways. First, judicial
enhancement of public information about executive operations is unlikely to
generate serious political backlash. Legislation like FOIA can take years or
decades to enact because of executive resistance; but despite continuing
presidential objections, access legislation is politically difficult to confront
and to circumscribe seriously in Congress. Second, judicial modifications
could be made subject to legislative or even executive revision. They might
be the kind of constitutional common law that should not qualify for
entrenchment by judicial preference alone.29 ' Although not without controversy, federal courts at times have established such norms. Leading examples

are Dormant Commerce Clause292 jurisprudence, Mirandawarnings,293 and the
prudential strand of standing doctrine.294 When this mutable form of doctrine
is generated, both judicial mistakes and ex ante deterrence of nonjudicial
system building become less troubling.
Finally, the threat to vibrant democratic politics is less severe in this
situation, even if judicial modifications are irreversible. The object of intervention is to improve public access to information about government operations. There is good reason to believe ordinary politics cannot always
maintain a well-functioning political system, one that subjects people in
291.
Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (1975) (exploring "a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions"); id. at 29
(explaining that "constitutional common law contains built-in safeguards-where the Court's rule is
perceived to have gone too far, it can be rejected or modified by the political process without the
necessity of a constitutional amendment"). Professor Monaghan suggested that the category of constitutional common law could itself depend on the presence of "debatable policy choices or uncertain
empirical foundations." Id. at 34; see also Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:

Protecting FundamentalValues With Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1575, 1737-53 (2001).
292.
See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984) (confirming
congressional authority to permit state regulation that would otherwise flunk the Court's Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine).
293.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("[Ulnless we are shown other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and
in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed.");
Monaghan, supra note 291, at 2, 15-17, 20-21; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440
(2000) ("Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.").
294.
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517
U.S. 544, 551, 558 (1996).
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power to adequate scrutiny and accountability without seriously impeding
executive functions. A partially insulated federal judiciary, acting with
restraint, is a source for correction.
Contrast situations in which the reliance on platforms is tougher to
defend. Social welfare rights-such as income support, education, housing,
and healthcare-are useful for this purpose. One might believe that
democracy will fail unless members of the polity are adequately paid, educated, and so forth. As with information access, it is difficult to imagine
courts independently designing a system of social welfare. Yet nonjudicial
actors have created an elaborate system for providing these benefits, relying
on both public and private resources. Maybe this is an adequate platform
for judicial intervention and system modification.
There are, however, critical differences between social welfare and
information access systems. Even assuming that both systems aim at equally
important objectives (which is at least plausible) and that there is no
greater risk of counterproductive backlash (which is more debatable), social
welfare systems are far weaker platforms. If nothing else, the presence of a
constitutional norm favoring downhill wealth transfers is difficult to identify.
In fact, conventional constitutional interpretation might yield something like
the opposite result, given the document's explicit protection of property
rights. 95 Furthermore, even if we should grant that minimum welfare is an
existing commitment within the U.S. Constitution, judicial intervention
into social welfare systems is just more difficult as a practical matter.
Current systems reflect priority choices and resource constraints that are
more brittle than comparable choices about information access.
Governments must choose not only a mix of public and private market
approaches to social welfare, but also an appropriate level of funding in light
of these and other commitments.296 Information works differently. The game
295.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V (regarding takings and due process); CHARLES A. BEARD, AN

ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 14-18 (1941); THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the problem of faction and property rights); cf.
Fallon, supra note 26, at 1808-09 & n.78 (noting that social welfare rights are not directly
addressed, and that their inclusion in constitutional law is philosophically debatable).
See SAGER, supra note 19, at 87 (wondering how, to what extent, and by whom medical
296.
care should be provided and funded); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 210-13, 227-29 (2004);
Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1896-97
(2004) (specifying an argument against judicially enforceable social welfare rights that emphasizes
large budgetary consequences and displacement of politically selected priorities); see also Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999) (suggesting justifications and forms for state court enforcement of
state social welfare rights).
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does not so closely approach zero-sum. With current communications
technology, access for one quickly becomes access for all. Operating
information access systems requires public resources, of course, but the
tradeoffs are less taxing. The platform for social welfare rights is less stable. If
elaboration from nonjudicial platforms is defensible in any instance, public
access is one.
CONCLUSION
Our approach to government secrecy and public access is flawed. It
incorporates poorly reconciled patches of constitutional law, accompanied
by justifications that could support either full-press constitutionalization or
complete judicial retreat. In this Article, I have claimed that constitutional
law and judicial review can play a positive role in mediating the demands of
access and the conditions for executive efficacy. That role requires
recognition that both secrecy and openness are indispensable components of
a successful democracy, and that the test for judicial intervention should
take account of existing nonconstitutional access systems. Both of these
lessons are reflected in the law and practices of many new democracies.
Yet the pertinence of existing systems turns out to be nonobvious.
Contentions about judicial incompetence are not perfectly aligned with the
viability of nonjudicial alternatives. In certain respects, these two arguments
conflict. The largely successful operation of a legislative and administrative
system for public access offers practical opportunities for judicial elaboration,
rather than an easy reason to forbid it. The general issue-how courts should
interact with systems generated by others-requires ongoing attention. But
information access is one field in which that relationship renders judicial
assistance legitimate, feasible, and desirable.
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